The political economy of milk price regulation in Montana. by Bronson, William O.
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1979 
The political economy of milk price regulation in Montana. 
William O. Bronson 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Bronson, William O., "The political economy of milk price regulation in Montana." (1979). Graduate Student 
Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8454. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8454 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
T h i s  i s  a n  u n p u b l i s h e d  m a n u s c r i p t  i n  w h i c h  c o p y r i g h t  s u b ­
s i s t s . An y  f u r t h e r  r e p r i n t i n g  o f  i t s  c o n t e n t s  m u s t  b e  a p p r o v e d
BY THE AUTHOR.
Ma n s f i e l d  L i b r a r y  
Un i v e r s i t y  o f  Mo n t a n a  
Da t e : 1 9  7  Q___________
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MILK PRICE REGULATION
IN MONTANA
By
William 0. Bronson 
B.A., University of Montana 1977 
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of 
Master of Public Administration 
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA 
1979
Approved by*
Chairman, Board of Ex&miners
Dean, Graduate School
Date
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: EP39255
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMT
OiSMrUttion R /M M iing
UMI EP39255
Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
uesf
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 -1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF T A B L E S ..................................... v
PREFACE ...........................................  vi
Chapter
I. PURPOSE AND STRUCTURES OF THE MONTANA MIIK
CONTROL LAW ................................. 1
Milk: A Thoroughly Regulated Commodity . . .  1
The Structure of the Dairy Industry ........  1
The Plight of Montana Dairymen
During the Depression................  3
Attempts At Self-Regulation ................  4
Development of the Montana Milk Control
Law: 1935-1979 ..........................  5The Board and Administrative
Organization ............................  11The Montana Dairy Ind u s t ry............  12
Summary ................................... 13
II. PATHWAY TO CRISIS: 1935-1958 ................  l6
The Formative Yea r s....................  l6
The 1957 Legislative Investigation........  21A Crisis Unresolved ........................ 29
Summary ................................... 31
III. CONFRONTATION AND DEVELOPMENT: 1959-1971 . . .  36
The 1959 Amendments: A Crisis Averted . . .  36
The Board and the Courts .  ..............  39Producer and Distributor Under the
1959 Amendments......................  43The 1966 Price-fixing Scandal..............  46
The 1971 Amendments........................ 48Summary................................. 51
IV. THE FRUSTRATIONS OF CONSUMERISM: 1973-1979 . . 55
A "Consumer" Board ........................  55
Consumer Frustration ......................  58Summary................................. 60
ii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter
V. AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF REGULATION..........  62
The Presence of Derived Externalities . . . .  62
Distribution Efficiency ....................  62
"Minimum" Pricing ........................  64Potential for Competitive Pricing..........  66
Milk Consumption and the Elasticityof Demand................................. 6?
Producer Price Dilemmas ....................  72
Summary ................................... 73
VI. INDUSTRY AND BOARD VIEWS OF THE L A W ..........  77
A New Economic O r d e r ......................  77
Industry views of Regulation ..............  77
Views of the Regulators....................  88
Industry and Regulator View
the C o n s u m e r ............................  90
Summary ..............   92
VII. LEGISLATORS V. THE LAW:
THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION................  96
Reform as Deregulation....................  96
Early Proposals............................  96A New Era of Change......................   . 98
Decontrol Proposals in the 1977
and 1979 Legislators....................  100Analysis of Legislative Attitudes ..........  103
Summary..................................... I05
VIII. ALTERNATIVES TO EXISTING REGULATION ..........  IO9
Varieties of Change........................  I09
A Closer Look At Deregulation..............  IO9Federal Milk Marketing Orders..............  112
An Incomes Policy: Target Pricing ........  II3Cooperatives and CollectiveBargaining..............................  116
Public Enterprise ..........................  118
A Consumer Council ........................  120Summary ................................... 121
111
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter
IX. SOURCES OF REFORM: AN EVALUATION............  125
Building a Constituency for Change ..........  125
The Legislature............................. 125
The Governor.................................  127Other Executive Branch Agencies ............  128
The Courts...................................  129Political Parties ........................... 130The Dairy Industry ......................... I30
The Public...................................  I31
S u m m a r y .....................................  132
X. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS....................... 134
A Historical Overview ...................  I34
A Modest Proposal ........................... I35
Conclusion ................................. I38
BIBLIOGRAPHY.........................................  lAO
IV
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF TABLES
1. Montana Milk Price and Sales Relationships,
1972-1975.....................................  69
2. Estimated Annual Effect of a Milk Price Increase
Excessive By Twelve Cents Per Gallon........ 71
3* Market Shares of Montana Processors, April 1978
and April 1979 •  .................    83
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
PREFACE
My interest in milk price regulation grew out of my 
work as Research Director for the Montana Republican Party 
in 1978. Part of this job involved the preparation of issue 
papers for legislative candidates* Since all milk control 
seemed to be a timely political topic, I developed a series 
of papers outlining the pros and cons of economic regula­
tion of the dairy industry* Of all my work, this series 
generated the greatest interest among candidates and party 
officials* Apparently I had judged the salience of this 
issue rather well*
I faced the subject of milk control once again in 
1979 when, as a lobbyist for the Associated Students of the 
University of Montana, I was asked to testify on behalf of 
two milk price deregulation bills that had been introduced 
in the Montana legislature* This exposure to the politics 
of the milk industry convinced me even more of its impor­
tance and the necessity of undertaking a detailed study of 
the subject*
This paper will be historical as well as evaluative 
in form. I Intend to explore the philosophical and legal 
basis of milk price regulation. The reader will be treated
VI
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to an extensive analysis of the Montana Milk Control Board s 
activities of the last forty years. One crucial aspect of 
this analysis is an understanding of how the hoard has 
related to its clientele, the government, and the consumer.
In addition, I will review the various attempts made in past 
years to substantially restructure the dairy industry 
through deregulation. New alternatives to existing law will 
he explored, with an eye on the potential reformers.
Some of the analysis contained in this paper is 
inconclusive. The complexities of milk control do not lend 
themselves to simple answers, as I shall demonstrate. The 
consequences of deregulation or alternative regulatory 
schemes, for example, are not always predictable. However,
I have made a sincere effort to examine all the possible 
assumptions and options. In this way, future analysts will 
have a basis upon which to act responsibly.
I have relied heavily on the work of Charles Wolf, 
Jr., head of the Rand Corporation’s Economics Department and 
director of the Rand Graduate Institute, in developing a 
method of critique. Dr. Wolf has postulated what he terms a 
"theory of non-market failure." Simply stated, Wolf 
believes that one cannot assume government to provide the 
perfect solutions for the asymmetry of the market system.
He has proposed a typology of observable non-market failures, 
and presented it in such a form as to allow a policy analyst
Vll
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to easily explore the consequences of public regulation»^
I will explain this theory in more detail in the body of the 
paper.
Some aspects of milk control will not be dealt with 
in this paper» They are: (1) dairy sanitation laws ; (2)
the national "milk scandals" of the Nixon presidency; and 
(3) the recent literature attacking the necessity of milk as 
an item of human consumption. A good study of each of these 
subjects is by rights the subject of other professional 
papers » Their relationship to my topic is not so crucial as 
to make their examination mandatory.
I believe it is appropriate to lay my "ideological" 
cards on the table now. I do not conceive of any serious 
policy analysis as value free; to believe otherwise is, to 
put it mildly, an impossibility. A scholar always brings 
certain presuppositions into his work, and for this he 
should not apologize. This does not mean that one should 
derQT all standards of balanced and objective observation»
It is imperative to state all sides of a debate as fairly as 
possible, but this should not imply that one is necessarily 
unconcerned with the outcome of that debate » My standard is 
that used by the late C. Wright Mills in his sociological 
studies: "I have tried to be objective. I do not claim to
be detached."
Vlll
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I subscribe to a school of thought which subjects 
the relationship between government regulation and the 
public welfare to great scrutiny. This school is common 
among acadamicians of the political left as well as the 
right. Public control of the industry's activities is often 
advocated by the industry and not the public. This raises a 
question of whether or not the ultimate benefits of regula­
tion are designed with the public interest in mind. The 
consumer may often bear the brunt of unreasonable and costly 
administration. Another aspect of this question is whether 
or not a symbiotic relationship exists between the regulator 
and the enterprise, and what effect this relationship has on 
the public. These questions will be uppermost in my mind 
throughout the course of this paper.
I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the 
assistance of various groups and individuals whom I have 
"milked" for information these past few months. Mr. Alfred 
Dougherty of Helena, who has observed the operation of the 
Montana dairy industry for over thirty years» cannot be 
thanked enough for his historical accounts. Mr. K. M . Kelly, 
Administrator of the Milk Control Division, Department of 
Business Regulation, has been kind in answering my numerous 
requests. Mr. Daniel Herbert, Chief Statistician for the 
Montana Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, has been 
equally helpful. I cannot leave mention of Mr. Jerome Cate,
IX
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Chief of the Antitrust Bureau, Department of Justice, for 
his kind assistance. The staff of the Montana Historical 
Society has graciously placed at my disposal several useful 
documents•
Various friends and acquaintances in the Montana 
legislature have provided useful insights. I especially 
recognize the comments of State Senator Bob Brown and 
State Representatives Ken Nortvedt, Jerry Metcalf, Bobbie 
Spilker and Mike Cooney. I also appreciate the comments of 
one individual who does not wish to be identified in this 
paper. I met this young gentleman in Helena during the 
legislative session. He has had connections with the dairy 
industry over the past few years, and his views were partic­
ularly helpful.
Finally, I extend my appreciation to my friends who 
have in many ways assisted with the development of this 
paper. All errors and omissions are entirely my respon­
sibility.
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NOTES
PREFACE
^Charles Wolf, Jr., "A Theory of Non-Market 
Failures," The Puhlic Interest, no. 55 (Spring 1979);
114-133-
^C. Wright Mills, The Marxists. (New York; Doubleday and Co., 1962; Dell Books, 1962).
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CHAPTER I
PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE MONTANA MILK CONTROL LAW
Milk» A Thoroughly Regulated Commodity
The production and distribution of milk has occupied
the attention of economists and health experts for several
years. Milk has been described as the most nutritionally
balanced food item and therefore, a necessary article of
human consumption. Since the early days of this century
milk has been treated by government as a commodity greatly
affected with the public interest-^
Montana's first experience with dairy regulation
came in 1911 when the legislature authorized the licensing
and sanitary inspection of milk production. These sanitary
laws have been modified and expanded through the years-
Today, health regulations are a shared responsibility of the
State Department of Livestock, Livestock Sanitary Board,
Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, and local boards 
2of health. Economic regulation would not arrive until 1935' 
Before examining the development of these rules, it is 
important to understand the nature of the milk industry.
The Structure of the Dairy Industry
Montana s dairy industry, like that of the entire 
nation, has been substantially transformed during the past
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fifty years. In the 1930's it was made up of several 
producer-distributors and producers- The former raised 
their own cows, milked them, processed the raw milk into 
fluid or manufactured products, and distributed these to 
local consumers. The latter sold his raw milk to nearby 
independent distributors who processed the milk for resale- 
These distributors were rare during the early twentieth 
century as were the major retail supermarkets. Producer- 
distributors were the dominant type of operation-^
Following the 1930s came a period of increased 
specialization in the production and marketing of milk- 
Distributors came into their own and replaced most of the 
small producer-distributors- By the 1960s, small indepen­
dent distributors known as jobbers appeared on the Montana 
scene. Jobbers purchased processed milk from large distrib­
utors and marketed it primarily in the small towns and rural 
areas; some jobbers can be found in big city markets. Many 
of the larger distributors have deemphasized direct home 
deliveries, leaving this task to locally owned grocery 
stores and interstate supermarket chains. This trend toward 
specialization has been common in many businesses in the 
United States.^
It is important to the subject of this paper to 
understand the pricing terminology used in the marketing of 
dairy products. Producer prices are those prices paid by
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distributors or processors to producers for raw milk. 
Wholesale prices refer to the prices paid by retailers for 
processed milk sold in bulk or packaged form. Retail prices 
are the prices paid by consumers at the store or on home 
delivery. Wholesale and retail prices are often considered 
together and are then termed resale prices.
The Plight of the Montana Dairyman During the Depression 
Montana dairy operators enjoyed prosperity until 
1929. With the coming of the great depression, consumer 
purchasing power collapsed. Producer-distributors and 
distributors were thrust into an extremely competitive 
situation. They engaged in price cutting and giveaway 
programs to attract customers. Unmarketed surpluses of 
fluid milk were dumped in order to reduce the supply and 
force prices upward. Distributors passed their losses back 
to their producer-suppliers, thus putting several dairy 
farmers out of business. Some dairy operators attempted to 
reduce their costs by cutting down on production expenses, 
including the costs of complying with state sanitary codes.̂  
By the mid-1930s, public authorities were convinced that an 
abundant supply of healthful milk would soon become a 
rarity. K. M. Kelly, Administrator of the Milk Control 
Division, Department of Business Regulation, cites a typical 
example of the chaotic conditions:
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In the late 1920s and early 1930s, we had about fifty- 
five dairies in Helena delivering milk to 12,000-15,000 
people. Each dairy was cutting prices and giving away 
milk and cream to steal customers, with most of the 
losses passed back to the producers. Producers were being forced out of business and the milk supply was in jeopardy.6
Aggravating this situation was the fact that milk was 
and still is an extremely perishable commodity. It cannot 
be stored in any form for any great length of time. Also, 
dairy cows are on a fixed production cycle that cannot be 
regulated by price considerations* A cow will produce twice 
daily regardless of the shifts in producer and resale prices- 
Distributors are aware of this cycle and can place the 
producer in a precarious situation when it comes to bargain­
ing for a price on raw milk. The producer has had little 
or no voice in this type of marketplace, especially when 
times were as rough as those of the depression.
Attempts at Self-Régulâtion
In 1934, Montana dairymen availed themselves of the 
remedies offered by the National Industrial Recover Act 
(NIRA). With support from the Dairy Division, Montana 
Department of Agriculture, the state was divided roughly 
along the Continental Divide into two marketing areas- All 
segments of the industry would voluntarily set and enforce 
a series of price codes within these zones- Regulations 
would be the responsibility of private enterprise with only
Qmodest government supervision.
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Self-regulation soon proved to be inadequate. By 
May of 1934, many voluntary agreements had broken down. 
Merchants inKalispell, for example, found their sales of 
packaged milk falling under the high retail prices set by 
the code. They were soon selling milk at pre-1934 prices. 
When the NIRA was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in late 1934, milk dealers decided to seek 
protection from state government. A well-organized, ad hoc 
lobby of producers and distributors attained this goal 
during the 1935 legislative session. Senate Bill I63, 
sponsored by State Senators Lars Angvick (R-Sheridan) and 
F. S. Karlberg, contained the elements of Montana's first 
milk control law. The condition of the milk industry was 
so chaotic as to convince nearly every legislator, regard­
less of party, of the need for regulation.^
Development of the Montana Milk Control Law; 19 35-1979
SB 163 was passed as a temporary relief measure. A 
clause at the end of the bill stipulated that the legislature 
could repeal milk control when it determined that the exist­
ing public emergency was at an end. The powers of that 
clause were never exercised. In 1939» the legislature re­
enacted most of the provisions of the 1935 act. These 
revisions are the basis of today's milk control law.^^
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Existing legislation lists a series of bold policy 
declarations- The legislature has determined in syllogistic 
fashion that (1) milk is necessary for human consumption; 
therefore, an adequate supply must be maintained; (2) the 
necessity of milk makes it a commodity affected by the 
public interest and potentially subject to government regula­
tion; (3) unfair and uneconomic practices in the dairy 
industry pose a constant threat to the quality and avail­
ability of the milk supply; so (4) state supervision of 
production and marketing is necessary and proper to maintain 
the public interest. The "law of supply and demand" is 
deemed inadequate to meet that same task.
Regulation of the dairy industry has always been 
carried out by a State Board of Milk Control. The 1935 law 
provided for three commissioners— the Chairman of the 
Livestock Sanitary Board, the Chief of the Dairy Division, 
Montana Department of Agriculture, and a representative of 
the general public. The 1939 revisions provided for a five 
member board consisting of the Chairman of the Livestock 
Sanitary Board and one representative from each of the 
following groups: producers, producer-distributors,
distributors, and consumers. A 1957 amendment eliminated 
producer-distributor membership and increased the number of 
members from the remaining three groups to two representa­
tives apiece. A 1959 amendment totally revamped membership
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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patterns and provided for a five-member, all-consumer board.
This structure remains intact today. Thus, supervision of
the dairy industry was the province of its members for almost 
12twenty years.
The chief function of the board has always been the 
provision of economic order through the fixing of minimum 
producer, wholesale, and retail prices. A use-classification 
system has been used since 1959 to rank and price all milk 
in the state. Class I or fluid milk is designed for drinking 
purposes. Class II comprises milk used in the manufacture 
of ice cream, sherbert, egg nog, sour cream, and related 
items. Class III includes products like butter and cheese 
as well as items not designated for human consumption; e.g., 
milk for livestock feed. Minimum producer prices are set 
for all classes of milk; resale price protection is extended 
to Class I products.
Procedures for developing minimum tariffs have 
changed substantially during the past forty years. Until 
1971, lengthy public hearings were held on the cost of 
producing, processing, and distributing fluid milk and milk- 
based products. Prices would be established so as to insure 
the operation costs of producers and distributors and 
possibly provide them with a modest profit. This method was 
abandoned in 1971 and replaced by the use of flexible 
formulas. These formulas are to be devised so as to bring
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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about automatic adjustments in all minimum prices as are 
justified by changes in production, processing, and distri­
bution costs. A public hearing is held to approve a sug­
gested formula, but all price changes occur without hearings
litunless the board is petitioned to revise the formula.
When establishing legal minimums, the Milk Control 
Board must follow fairly specific legislative criteria.
Early legislation mandated minimum producer prices be set at 
least equal to one-half of the minimum retail price. Also, 
fixed prices had to take into account the purchasing power 
of the public. It is difficult to assess from available 
records just how serious the old milk boards implemented 
that provision. Today’s law requires flexible formulas to 
be based upon such factors as milk prices in adjacent and 
neighboring states, consumer purchasing power, and indices 
of production and distribution costs- The old "fifty 
percent" section regarding producer prices was repealed by 
the 1959 legislature.^^
Administrative procedures for implementing the milk 
control law have been constantly revised and updated since 
1935' Originally, the board exercised its power only after 
a petition in support of regulation was submitted by a local 
association of producers and distributors. The board would 
hold a cost of production hearing, devise a marketing area, 
and fix minimum prices to be charged in that area. Sales
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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below minimum prices would be prohibited. The board was 
required to promote and foster these local associations 
under specific rules. The associations would become instru­
mentalities of the board in order to carry out the intent of 
the law. In 1959. the board was given authority to hold 
public hearings and establish prices on its own initiative. 
The 1975 legislature eliminated the requirement of promoting 
local dairy associations ; this provision had become an 
anachronism after the organization of the State Department 
of Business Regulation. Thus, the law has progressed from 
a quasi-trade regulation measure to a more sophisticated 
scheme of independent government supervision.^^
In order to insure the propriety of price-fixing 
rules and orders, the board has possessed the power to 
subpoena books and records of all milk dealers. A uniform 
system of accounting for milk use by distributors has been 
required since 1959 « Also, rules of fair trade have been 
provided for in law and board regulations. These rules 
prohibit such practices as rebates, kickbacks, extension of 
credit to retailers by distributors, and sales of milk below 
minimum prices. These activities circumvent the purpose of 
price-fixing and therefore, cannot be allowed.
Enforcement procedures have also been created. Milk 
distributors must be bonded in order to do business. All 
milk dealers except retailers must have a license in order
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to do "business. All milk dealers except retailers must
have a license in order to traffic in milk. Licenses can be
suspended or revoked for failure to comply with the law. In
addition, the board may seek specific civil and criminal
prosecution of violators ; it may also seek remedies in
equity, such as a court injunction to restrain a dealer from
breaking the law. Sufficient procedural safeguards; i.e.,
due notice of and requirement of public hearing, have been
provided by the legislature to insure fairness to all
1 Aparties in the exercise of price regulation.
Board activities are financed entirely through
nominal license fees and assessments per hundredweight of
milk sold by producers and distributors. The legislature
previously fixed the amount of assessments; since 1975; the
Department of Business Regulation has taken over this
responsibility through the administrative hearings process.
Up to 1959. price controls were exercised only in
marketing areas designated by the board. These areas
generally comprised only the territory immediately adjacent
to cities and towns* Amendments have since extended price
control to all areas of the state. The same producer and
resale prices prevail in every area of the state, although
many marketing areas are retained for administrative 
20purposes.
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The Board and Administrative Organization
The Milk Control Board is now attached to the 
Department of Business Regulation for administrative pur­
poses- The Milk Control Division of the department serves 
as staff support for the board. It is headed by an adminis­
trator and employs approximately ten other individuals.
(All employment figures are for Montana fiscal year 1979 -) 
Employees are primarily involved in field audits of licensed 
milk dealers- The budget for the division in fiscal 1979
was $249,928 ; all of this was derived from license fees and
21dealer assessments.
The Montana Administrative Procedures Act (MAPA) is 
the guide for executive agencies and board when promulgating 
rules or orders designed to carry out the intent of legis­
lation. Under MAPA, the Milk Control Board and the Depart­
ment of Business Regulation have adopted a series of rules 
affecting the milk industry. Significant ones include (1) 
elaboration of reporting requirements for producers and 
distributors ; (2) provision for restitution of underpayments 
by distributors to producers; (3) procedures for termination 
of supply contracts between producers and distributors ; (4) 
unfair trade practices; (5) fee assessments; and (6) the 
indices and factors utilized in developing price formulas- 
Specific price orders are also adopted under MAPA rules- 
All rules and orders are published in the Administrative 
Rules of Montana.
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The Modem Dairy Industry
The dairy industry has undergone significant changes 
since the 1930's; indeed, these changes greatly influenced 
the development of the milk control law. Under a regulated 
economy, technological innovations have been striking. Milk 
now has an increased shelf life over that of thirty years 
ago. Modem refrigeration techniques can keep milk fresh in 
the dairy case for up to two weeks as opposed to the two day 
interval of years past. The productivity of the milk 
business has also advanced. Scientific breeding techniques 
have increased per-cow production levels although the cycle 
itself remains unchanged. Sophisticated handling virtually 
eliminates any contact of raw milk with the atmosphere. 
Refrigerated milk, whether raw or processed, can be shipped 
over great distances without much fear of spoilage ; this was 
not possible during the 1930’s.
Major technological changes have been costly.
Capital investments by producers have been so significant as 
to make them even more subject to instability should prices 
prove unfavorable. Producers also face the consequences of 
modem inflation; i.e., increased food charges and heating 
bills. Departure from the dairy industry has continued on a 
steady basis since the depression. The number of processing- 
distribution operations fell 75 percent between I961 and 
1976, from ninety-three to twenty-three plants- The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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national average decline during this same period was
70 percent. The number of producers has declined also.
In 1959» there were roughly 825 producers in Montana; in
19751 there were 258. This decrease measured 69 percent.
(Recently, the number of producers has risen to about 330*
indicating some improvement in the health of the producer 
2U-segment.) These declines will become important when the 
varied manifestations of price regulation are examined.
Summary
Concern over the quality and quantity of milk has led 
to it becoming the most regulated food commodity in the 
United States. The dairy industry has not been subjected to 
the same market conditions as has much of American business 
enterprise. Therefore, Montana dairymen and lawmakers have 
designed extensive regulations to insure a stabilized and 
sanitary system of producing and marketing milk. Wolf uses 
the term "internalities" to describe the standards which 
guide and evaluate public regulation. Internalities become 
a substitute for the workings of the price system.
Internalities do not necessarily prove effective in 
the course of public administration. The fact that many 
dairymen have departed the industry suggests the possibility 
of some improper or ineffective implementation of the milk 
control law. Subsequent chapters will probe this critical 
question in detail.
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CHAPTER II
PATHWAY TO CRISIS: 1935-1958
The Formative Years
The first Milk Control Board was organized in mid- 
1935 shortly after the governor’s approval of SB I63.
W. J. Butler, Chairman of the Livestock Sanitary Board, 
would head the new body. The membership was rounded off by 
the appointment of B. F. Thrailkill, representing the State 
Department of Agriculture, and G. A. Norris, representing 
the State Department of Agriculture, and G» A. Norris, 
representing the public. Norris was the former Chief of the 
State Dairy Division and was a creamery operator in Billings 
at the time of appointment. Thus, the first board had a 
great deal of expertise in dairying. Norris would also 
serve as the board's chief administrator when it was not in 
session.^
Norris expressed the sentiments of the new board in
a 1935 press release:
The main purpose and intent of the law is to eliminate 
that dangerous element of supply so numerous throughout the state known as the chiseler, and the price cutter, 
who have also been the uncontrolled and dangerous 
producer of this important and necessary food commodity, coming into competition with the reverse type, the 
legitimate milk producer, who carries a heavy investment 
in the required equipment necessary to the production of 
pure, wholesome, safe milk and cream from healthy dairy 
cows, and operating under a license and inspection
16
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service of the Montana Livestock Board. . . . It is very 
apparent that the milk industry in the organized trade 
areas under milk control have taken on a new life • • ■ 
t his is . . .  to the advantage of these actively 
engaged in the business of producing and distributing milk, and . • . the consumer.2
The board proceeded to enforce the law vigorously. 
Dairymens' associations were formed, petitions for regulation 
circulated, cost of production hearings held, and marketing 
areas and price orders established. Norris began cracking 
down on the dreaded "chiselers" and "bootleggers." In a 
celebrated case, the board successfully reprimanded the 
Helena Creamery for refusing to pay minimum prices to 
producers. U.S. Senator Burton K. Wheeler maneuvered behind 
the scenes to cancel Fort Harrison’s supply contract with 
that distributor. Norris also pursued violations by reluc­
tant Ravalli county distributors. These firms benefited 
from sympathetic local judges who would not convict them 
for violating minimum price orders. The Stevensville 
justice of the peace, for example, declared the entire milk 
control law unconstitutional in late 1935* Norris' persis­
tence finally wore down the Bitterroot operators, and he 
secured their adherence to the law by 193^.^
A "Constitutional Convention of the Fluid Milk 
Industry" was held under board auspices in Helena during the 
month of May, 1936. The convention, composed of producers 
and distributors, ratified a board-approved document which 
governed the operations of local dairymens' associations.
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This action was another indication of the binding relation-
ship between the industry and the regulator- Assistant
Attorney General E- K- Matson reiterated the purpose of the
milk control law when speaking to the assembled delegates :
The public has been misinformed to a certain extent 
and do not understand the bill, but there is something 
that can be attained, and I believe you people who are 
here can do your part in educating the public as to the purpose of the law . . . the major purpose is financial 
protection of the dairy industry - 5 (Emphasis is 
Matson's-)
The first two years of board operation were often 
plagued by financial and enforcement problems. License fees 
and assessments mandated by the law were insufficient to 
cover most of the board's legitimate expenses- Enforcement 
powers of the board also needed some teeth- During the 1937 
legislative session, the board and the milk dealers' associ­
ations sought additional revenues and powers- Their pro­
posal, House Bill 1?0, received a comfortable margin of 
support in the House but died on the floor of the Senate- A 
number of senators partial to the bill were sick and there­
fore, absent during voting. The industry did take some 
comfort in the defeat of another bill, House Bill 21, which 
would have repealed the milk control law. (Interestingly, 
one of the strongest opponents of HE 170 was a Ravalli 
county legislator with a bright political future—
Lee Metcalf -)^
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Another attempt to improve the law in 1939 was suc­
cessful. Dairy lobbyists, with strong bipartisan support in 
the new legislature, secured the passage of House Bill 201. 
The new board was organized in May of that year. Norris was 
appointed its first executive secretary. With an indication 
of strong legislative backing, the new board began carrying
out its duties as diligently as had its immediate prede- 
7cessor.
On some occasions during the 1930s and 19^0s, it 
is apparent from the record of public hearings that consumer 
concerns and board/industry interests were conflicting. A 
public hearing held in Havre in November 1939 over proposed 
raises in minimum producer and resale prices stirred con­
siderable discontent. Mrs. Charles Hanson, speaking for the 
Havre Parent-Teachers Association, expressed fears that the 
suggested price increase would not be in the pecuniary 
interest of the local citizens. A certain Mr. Lineberger 
attacked the proposals as being designed only for the 
benefit of area milkmen. The board was almost nonplussed 
by these presentations; the record indicates that they could 
not comprehend why these citizens would not accept the 
beneficence of the milk control law. Regardless of who was 
right or wrong in this controversy, it is clear that one 
perception of economic regulation was not always held in 
common. (An interesting sidenote: Mr. Lineberger's
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testimony was described in an initial set of the minutes as 
"making a few other wild remarks." The minutes were later
changed to indicate a more discreet presentation by the
8Havre citizen.)
A similar occurrence took place in Butte in the 
spring of 1942. One irate housewife took exception to the 
board's procedural rules. Notices of public hearings were 
printed by the newspapers in small type in the legal section. 
No one read these seemingly innocuous passages, or so the 
woman claimed. She criticized local dairymen for profi­
teering in wartime and seeking prices sure to cut the con­
sumption of Butte citizens. The board was visibly annoyed 
by her comments. Again, perceptions had a tendency to
Qdiverge from one, common perspective.̂
Despite these incidents, the board proceeded with 
the notion that their actions were definitely in the public 
interest. Distributors and producers worked together to 
insure the law's success. Production levels did stabilize, 
and violations were regularly prosecuted during the 1940s.
The board's prices were subject to federal oversight by the 
Office of Price Administration during World War II. In 
1944, Norris resigned the position of executive secretary 
for reasons of health. Allen Klemme, a former Bozeman area 
dairyman and deputy of the Milk Control Board, was chosen 
as Norris' successor.
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The 19 57 Legislative Investigation
By the mid-1950s there were indications that the 
hoard's operations were coming into serious question from 
many quarters. Wolf suggests that agency functions approach 
a critical state when intemalities hear no clear or 
reliable connection with the purposes that agency was 
designed to serve. An additional problem is the presence 
of "distributional inequities" in agency practice. These 
inequities are indexed on the power of the agency over its 
clientele and v i c e - v e r s a . T h e  following is an examination 
of improper intemalities and identifiable distributional 
inequities•
Executive Secretary Klemme had noticed several 
misunderstandings about board prerogatives and activities. 
For example, the Wolf Point Chamber of Commerce had improp­
erly assumed the authority to grant price increases to 
local dairymen in late 1944. Klemme also reported that 
many Bozeman area producers in 194? had little or no idea 
about the milk board's existence. There was evidence to 
suggest that local distributors were keeping their producers
in the dark in order to exploit a natural economic 
1 2advantage.
The quality of milk board records was beginning to 
deteriorate in the late 1940s. The number of meetings and 
public hearings was becoming infrequent. By the mid-1950s,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
an aggressive infancy had been superceded by mid-age 
senility
The Montana Dairy Producers* Association report to 
the board in 1955 indicated some serious reservations about 
the quality of regulation, although the association had no 
desire to abolish the law. They accused the board of lax 
enforcement and appeasement of violators. Cost studies were 
found to be inadequate and infrequent. The Montana Dairy 
Industries Association, a distributors' group, expressed 
some concerns of their own. Some of the group's members 
were concerned that executive sessions of the board were not 
closed to all industry officials. Supplementary evidence 
was supposedly introduced during these closed sessions, or 
so some distributors claimed. This evidence was not subject 
to critique during regular hearings. The board heard many 
of the same allegations during their 1956 meetings.
Producers and distributors foresaw crisis arising during 
the coming legislative session.
Their prediction turned out to be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Six bills were dropped into the hopper of the 
Senate Agriculture Committee in early 1957' All of the 
measures purported to make major changes in milk board 
composition, reporting requirements, and enforcement powers* 
A joint House-Senate Agriculture Committee hearing on all 
six proposals was held in February, mid-way through the
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legislative session.
John C. Harrison, lobbyist for the Milk Producers'
Association, attacked what he termed the limited reporting
procedures authorized under the 1939 act. Detailed records
of milk usage and wastage were not required or utilized
extensively. Inadequate and insufficient records produced
serious consequences for his employers :
We feel that more detailed record keeping and inspec­
tion is desirable in that in the existing law the 
producer never knows what becomes of his milk and, when 
he has a surplus, there is a feeling that the producers 
are not being paid for what they are delivering.l6
Harrison also argued for strengthened civil penalties 
against violators of the milk control law.
William Armstrong, President of the Milk Producers' 
Association, backed up the complaints of his constituents. 
The dairy industry had undergone tremendous changes since 
the 1930s, he argued. In the old days, there were many 
producer distributors, and it was only fair to include one 
of their group on the Milk Control Board. By 1957» only ten 
producer distributors were left in the state, as opposed to 
some sixty distributors and some 1000 bona fide producers. 
Armstrong's association felt that the board was now imbal­
anced in favor of the distributors. This imbalance was felt 
both in terms of numbers and in unfavorable board decisions.
An expanded role for the producer was necessary to restore
T_8equality under the law.
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A Democrat legislator from Stillwater County alleged 
that minimum prices were not being set according to law. An 
easily missed section of the 1939 law declared that the 
minimum retail price could be set no more than twice estab­
lished producer price. Yet in his home county, a producer 
received eight cents per quart of raw fluid milk sold. The 
retail price in his area was twenty-three cents- The 
producer was getting only about 35 percent of the legal 
retail price when he should have been getting 50 percent.
These violations were claimed to be common in other marketing
19areas in the state.
These criticisms were disputed by lobbyists for the 
Montana Dairy Industries Association. There was undoubtedly 
some contrast between their statements before this joint 
legislative committee and their reports to the board in 1955 
and 1956. Strengthened reporting requirements were unneces­
sary and would be unworkable. Stan Halvorsen, the manager of 
Equity Co-op Supply of Kalispell— a processor and distrib­
utor— claimed that the present law was sufficient and needed 
no substantive changes. His testimony was corroborated by 
other witnesses including self-proclaimed "producers." Some 
legislators were perplexed by this apparent conflict between 
producers on the need for changes in the law. One gets the 
feeling from the testimony that these legislators were 
suspicious of the motives of producers who sided with the
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20Dairy Industries Association. A confused and apparently
divided Senate Committee killed the bills during a regular
21meeting two days later.
Many people in the dairy industry were not optimistic 
about the future. Criticisms like those registered during 
the hearing would not subside. Failure to act might fan the 
flames of a strong effort to repeal the entire milk control 
law. Producers and even some distributors prevailed upon 
the legislative leadership to conduct a special investigation 
of the matter. House Speaker Eugene Mahoney (D-Thompson 
Falls) concurred with their request. On February 19, 1957, 
the House approved a motion by Rep. Fred Barrett (D-Chester) 
to appoint a special investigative committee with full 
subpoena powers. The speaker appointed two attorneys—  
Charles Cerovski (D-Lewiston) and B. W. Thomas (R-Chinook)—  
and three farmer-ranchers— Gordon McOmber (D-Fairfield,)
Jake Frank (D-Park City) and Jerry Smeltzer (R-Baker)— to
22carry out the task.
During the next two weeks, the select committee 
interviewed thirty witnesses representing the industry and 
government. They also attended a milk board hearing then 
underway in Butte. In the waning days of the session, the 
committee reported their findings. Accompanying their report 
was a list of sixteen recommendations.^^ The report was 
almost a journalist’s dream.
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The committee concluded that the milk control law 
was fine in intent but in need of major revisions. They 
concurred with several producers that representation on the 
board had been diluted and that equity had to be restored.
The committee reserved its strongest criticism for the 
board's exercise of its price-fixing powers. The legislators 
discovered that few records were kept of public hearings. 
Written findings of fact and conclusions of law were 
generally unavailable. The legislators indicated that there 
was often insufficient evidence gathered during public 
hearings upon which to base board decisions. Inconsistent 
and contestable rulings were a frequent result of these 
discrepancies.
Evidence also pointed to a near breakdown of board 
authority. Some prices were being set by producer-distrib­
utor agreements in open defiance of board orders. Board 
meetings were infrequent and review of existing price orders 
was rare. This was proving to be a financial disaster for 
some producers who had not received a price increase in ten 
years! The board was also found guilty of failing to enforce 
what was known as Attorney General's Opinion Number 18, which 
had been issued in 19^9* This opinion required distributors 
who purchased milk in one marketing area and processed it 
for resale in another to pay the producers at least the 
minimum price prevailing in the area where the milk was
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ultimately sold. Since inter-market purchases were becoming 
frequent, producers and the select committee reasoned that 
producers could be easily cheated without enforcement of the
. . 25opinion.
The committee also took note of dissension between 
producers and distributors. This situation had developed 
due to lax reporting requirements and the board's failure to 
inspect and validate distributor milk testing programs. The 
legislators agreed with many producers that some distributor 
reports were misrepresenting actual milk use. For example, 
it was alleged that distributors would label much of the 
producer's milk supply as "surplus milk," i.e., milk in 
amounts over and above the amount necessary to supply con­
sumer demands. Surplus milk commanded a far lower price 
than regular or "base" milk. Yet, some of this surplus found 
its way into regular use and was sold to retailers or con­
sumers at high prices. The middleman would pocket the profit
2éfrom this unethical transaction.
The services of Allen Klemme were found wanting. 
Klemme was deemed to be an incompetent hearing examiner and 
incapable of developing all the necessary evidence upon which 
to base adequate price orders. He was also found to be 
indecisive and inconsistent in handling other business of 
the board. Board members were chastised for not disciplining 
or firing Klemme. County attorneys were also criticized for
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not cooperating in the prosecution of complaints as was 
their legal obligation. Political pressures on these
27officials was believed to be the source of their inaction.
Finally, legislators took exception to the activities
of Merlin Madsen, a Missoula distributor who had served on
the board since 19^9* Madsen was accused on controlling the
action of the board, possibly to his own personal advantage.
The complaint was made by producers and some of Madsen's
competitors in the distribution and processing business. A
cursory review of Milk Board minutes from 19^9 to 1956
verifies this accusation. For example: on some occasions,
Madsen was unwilling to pursue needed price changes for
producers. His economic strength and personal persuasiveness
28was obviously very significant.
The legislators recommended the replacement of the 
old board members and executive secretary with new 
individuals. The new board was requested to establish 
concrete rules governing hearing procedures, review existing 
price orders, and develop adequate cost data and uniform 
standards for fixing prices. The board was also requested 
to meet on a monthly basis and issue its findings and con­
clusions in written form. Distributors were urged to file 
honest disposition reports with the board and producers. 
Testing procedures of distributors should also be inspected 
by the board for their degree of validity. An interim
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committee was suggested as a forum for writing extensive
29amendments to the 1939 law.
Rep. Cerovski and the other committee members pro­
posed a temporary reform package— HB 481— as a sign of good 
faith on the part of the legislature. The bill would alter 
the disposition of seats on the board to insure equality of 
representation by the various groups. Two producers, two 
distributors, and two consumers would be appointed to the 
new board which would continue under the chairmanship of the 
head of the Livestock Sanitary Board. A requirement to hold 
meetings every sixty days was agreed to, as was a clause 
urging the board to maintain policy of nondiscrimination in
the implementation of the milk control law. HB 481 passed
30with little opposition.-'^
A Crisis Unresolved
The Milk Control Board was not out of the newspapers 
at the end of the 1957 legislature. When the old board 
members refused to resign as the select committee had recom­
mended, Governor J. Hugo Aronson summarily fired them. Their 
replacements were installed immediately. Aronson carefully 
chose the new board members so as to restore confidence in 
the administration of the law. The new board soon requested 
the resignation of Allen Klemme; he was replaced by 
T. p. McNulty, a cooperative extension agent from the Great 
Falls area.
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The reconstituted board proceeded to restore integ­
rity and equity in the regulatory process* However, the 
next few months would prove to be a trying experience. The 
board voted by a split decision not to enforce the attorney 
general's Opinion Number 18. This action disturbed pro­
ducers affected by intermarket purchases. Also, the years of 
lax enforcement and inconsistent administration could not be
removed overnight. Many legal challenges to board decisions
32were filed by consumers and producers throughout 1958*
Two major court cases decided in 1958 were not 
especially helpful in developing momentum. In 
Heimbichner v. Montana Milk Control Board, the Montana 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of James Heimbichner, a dairy 
producer who claimed that an October, 1957» price order 
violated the express provisions of the Milk Control Act.
The minimum retail price in Heimbichner* s marketing areas 
was twenty-four cents per quart. However, the board had 
approved a special minimum retail price of ninety-two cents 
for a multiple package of four quarts; the average price of 
a quart in this package was twenty-three cents* Heimbichner 
received eleven and one-half cents per quart of raw milk 
sold, or one-half of the price of a single quart of milk 
sold in the multiple package. While this seems to agree 
with the "fifty percent provision" of the law, Heimbichner 
argued— and the court agreed— that the relevant retail price
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was the single quart sale price* Heimbichner was entitled
to a reimbursement of one-half cent per quart sold under the
32invalid price order*
The Heimbichner decision was mild in comparison to
the March, 1958» decision of Butte District Judge John
McCleman* Upon the arguments of a Bozeman milk distributor,
Judge McCleman ruled the wholesale and retail price-fixing
powers of the board unconstitutional. The decision was to
have confusing ramification over the course of the next two 
3kyears *
By November, 1958, board members were operating under 
a legal and administrative quandry* A special public 
hearing that month indicated that dairymen, the state 
Chamber of Commerce, labor and womens' groups all favored 
retention of the milk control law, but these groups were 
undecided as to how to correct the deficiencies* Shortly 
before this hearing, representatives from both producer and 
distributor associations began a series of joint meetings in 
order to draw up a workable solution. There was a mildly 
optimistic mood among dairymen and concerned citizens as the 
1959 legislative session was about to open*
Summary
Despite opposition from some reluctant dairymen and 
consumers, the Montana Milk Control Board was determined to 
bring what it saw as economic justice and stability to an
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industry plagued by chaotic conditions. From this 
writer* s personal acquaintance with many early producers and 
distributors in the Great Falls and Havre areas, it is safe 
to conclude that their intentions were extremely honorable.
The board regressed from a period of sincere, posi­
tive vitality in the late 1930s and early 19^0s to one of 
laxity and inequity by the 1950s. Many distributors were 
exploiting their natural economic advantage over producers. 
Loopholes in the 1939 law prevented aggrieved parties from 
correcting injustices. The board had become lax in recti­
fying deficiencies— in part due to strong influence on their 
direction by certain distributors. This is not to suggest 
that all producers were honest or that all distributors were 
scalawags. Some of the animosity between segments of the 
dairy industry was grounded more in unfounded suspicion than 
in real exploitation.
Distributional inequities and inadequate interna- 
lities were the rule of operation for the board by 1957. A 
new board flush with integrity was not enough to combat the 
complex problems that had arisen over the years. Pragmatic 
dairymen knew they would have to clean up their own house 
or face the extinction of the milk control law.
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CHAPTER III
CONFRONTATION AND DEVELOPMENT: 1959-1971
The 1959 Amendments: A Crisis Averted
After long and hard "bargaining, representatives of 
the Dairy Producers' Association and the Dairy Industries 
Association prepared a compromise reform of the milk control 
law for the 1959 legislature. The House Agriculture Commit­
tee sponsored it as House Bill 2?. The bill seemed to 
answer most of the producers’ major complaints. Uniform 
and detailed reporting requirements would be instituted by 
the board on a reasonable basis. The provision for bonding 
of distributors would give the dairy farmer a legal method 
of recovery in the event of violations. Local advisory 
boards would give both segments of the industry a chance to 
participate in the determination of equitable prices. The 
board could now act on establishment of marketing areas and 
prices without the need for petitions by local dairy 
associations
Bringing the entire state under milk control was 
another feature of the bill strongly supported by producers. 
Bob Ellis, Secretary-treasurer of the Helena Milk Producers’
36
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Association, perceived this as providing the end to unfair
trade practices in the industry. The competitive pressures
from unregulated areas of the state would cease, and order
2could return to the industry.
The all-consumer hoard was perhaps the most striking 
innovation contained in HB 2?. Many dairymen had a hard 
time swallowing this change, but finally accepted it as a 
viable alternative. Consumers with no interest in the milk 
industry might well be the best arbiters between the conflict­
ing claims of producers and distributors- Their presence 
would also give at least the impression that the consumer's
3interest was being observed.
There was some recorded opposition to HB 27. Gene 
Picotte, a Helena attorney and former legislator, attacked 
the proposal during hearings as a "dictator bill;" its 
strict reporting requirements would unjustly drive small 
dairymen out of business. The extension of pricing authority 
was considered inappropriate and destructive of competition- 
He predicted that the bill would be declared unconstitutional 
and that its consequences would haunt the legislature in 
coming years -̂  Picotte's first prediction would eventually 
be disproven; his second one, however, could be accepted on 
its face value.
Mrs- Harold Wright, speaking for the executive com­
mittee of the Montana Womens' Federation, opposed the bill
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as giving too much authority to individuals without exper­
tise in dairying. Her position was supported by a few 
independent producers and distributors present at the same 
hearing. Legislators were admittedly baffled by her testi­
mony, since other members of the federation had offered 
their advice during drafting of the bill and found the 
proposed amendments acceptable.^
The disagreement within the womens' group did not 
stop the legislature from enacting HB 2?. It passed the 
House 44-20 and the Senate 35-18. The opposition did take 
on some interesting characteristics. Entire legislative 
delegations from Sheridan, Wibaux, Gallatin, Broadwater, 
Meagher and Powder River Counties voted against the measure. 
All but one of the Park County delegates was opposed. Few 
urban legislators voted against the measure. The favorable 
urban vote might be explained by the provision for an all­
consumer board. Conversely, this might explain the strong 
negative vote by some rural legislators.̂  (Gallatin County 
comprises one of the larger milksheds in the state.)
The new board immediately began the task of imple­
menting the amendments. They revised their fair trade rules 
and state marketing areas* Public hearings, cost surveys 
and field investigations proceeded vigorously into the 1960s. 
Increased revenues from revised license fees subsidized the 
board's heavy agenda. The board again experienced the 
vitality of its early years.̂
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The Milk Board aind the Courts
The early i960's witnessed some of the board's most 
important dealings with the Montana judicial system. The 
impact of some of the more critical cases will be discussed 
below.
Judge McCleman' s unfavorable 1958 ruling would rear 
itself in two cases* The Montana Supreme Court rejected a 
restraining order based on that decision in Milk Board v. 
District Court, decided in i960. The court, by a 4-1 vote 
quashed a restraining order issued by District Judge Philip 
Duncan of Dillon. Duncan's order was issued after two 
Beaverhead County consumers asserted the validity of 
McCleman's decision. Duncan also ruled that board decisions 
affecting the Beaverhead County area were not founded upon 
factual evidence, and that the local advisory board appointed 
in accord with the 1959 amendments was unfamiliar with local 
economic conditions* The Supreme Court accepted the board's 
argument that the issue of constitutionality had become moot 
by virtue of the 1959 amendments and that public hearings 
were held in accord with the law. No direct ruling on
Oconstitutionality was made, however.
In Milk Board v. Maier. issued in late I96I, the 
Supreme Court again rejected a claim of unconstitutionality 
filed by a former Butte dairy operator who was delinquent in 
paying his license fees and assessments. The McCleman
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decision was again rejected as moot without a direct state­
ment as to the milk law's constitutionality. The justices 
did uphold the power of civil suit granted to the board under 
the law.^
Both the District Court and Maier decisions focused 
on constitutionality only as a secondary issue. The Milk 
Control Board was definitely interested in asserting the 
constitutionality of its price-fixing powers as the prime 
issue in a case.^® It would soon have that opportunity.
Jack Rehbert, owner of a Billings dairy farm, provided the 
direct challenge of the law that its proponents and oppo­
nents had sought for years. Rehberg began selling milk in 
the Billings area in 1962 for less than the legal minimum 
price. A board injunction to restrain Rehberg’s activities 
was denied by District Court Judge Charles Sande in early 
1962. The board immediately appealed the matter to the 
State Supreme Court.
Rehberg's defense focused on the very heart of the 
law. His attorneys challenged the price-fixing powers as 
they were a denial of the right of contract under the U.S. and 
Montana constitutions. They also claimed that the law con­
stituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers, 
since the Montana legislature had never established a formal 
policy to fix prices. Neither had the legislature prescribed
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standards and guides when delegating those powers. The 
Rehberg defense relied heavily on two recently decided 
southern cases, Harris v. Duncan and Gwynette v. Mevers. 
which declared that milk was not affected with a public
12interest and therefore, not a proper concern of government.
The Supreme Court rejected the defense's arguments 
without much fanfare. The right contract was not absolute, 
the court declared. It was subordinate to "reasonable 
restraint and regulation by the state in the exercise of its 
sovereign prerogative— police p o w e r * T h e  justices were 
unwilling to question the economic wisdom of the legislature 
when enacting price-fixing laws; this was not within the 
purview of the judicial system. The Montana court adopted 
the rule of the U.S. Supreme Court in Nebbia v. New York 
that the court's interest lay only in whether the law in 
question was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious in its 
execution. Chief Justice James T- Harrison, speaking for 
the majority, found no evidence of inequitable administra­
tion of the milk control law.
The court also determined that the legislature had 
provided sufficient standards to guide the board in its 
activities* In no way was the board exercising overbroad 
administrative discretion. The decision was warmly greeted 
by the board and the industry as the culmination of years of 
unanswered questions* (The court ruled in favor of the
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board on a 3-2 vote. Justice Hugh Adair and Stanley Doyle 
gave no reasons for their dissents*
Attorneys may dispute the point, hut it can he 
argued that the 1959 amendments may have preserved the law's 
constitutionality. The earlier 1935 and 1939 laws smacked 
of industry-oriented trade regulation and may have heen 
unacceptable in light of the Schecter decision. It should 
he remembered that under the 1939 law, the hoard acted only 
upon the petition of the industry ; the 1959 amendments gave 
the hoard the primary power to exercise price-fixing.
The milk hoard did not fare well in two other cases.
In another 1961 case. Milk Board v. Community Creamery, the 
Supreme Court ruled that a 1957 hoard order still in effect 
setting minimum prices for milk furnished to Missoula schools 
was illegal. The 1939 law upon which the order was based 
did not mention the authorized fixing of prices on sales to 
public schools. The court also declared that alleged viola­
tions of fair trade rules in the Missoula area were unfounded, 
since the board had not adopted specific rules implementing 
the suggested statutory prohibitions. The court believed 
that the milk statute was not self-executing; it needed an 
affirmative response on the part of the hoard. (The 1959 
law did bring schools under the jurisdiction of the hoard.
A price order based on the law would he acceptable to the 
courts.
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Another district court decision rendered in i960 in
Gallatin County required a special price hearing and order
for a unique form of marketing— on-the-farm sales. The
court ruled that the Gallatin farmer in question supervised
17a dairy operation that had not been considered in statute. '
The trial judge, in making his findings, made one interesting
observation about the potential distributional inequities
inherent in government regulation:
This milk control act, that started as a shield for the 
embattled and poverty stricken dairy farmer, may well end as a sword to destroy his economic freedom.18
The truth of that statement would not just be measured by
the problems of the past, it would be an accurate prophecy
of the future•
Producer and Distributor Under the 19 59 Amendments
The 1959 compromise did not end the frequent animos­
ity between segments of the Montana dairy industry. Two 
incidents that occurred during the 1960s bear out this 
observation.
The record of a price hearing held in Missoula in 
the fall of i960 indicated that dairymen were not of one 
opinion on the subject of regulation. Local producers 
asserted the need for strong supervision by the board. The 
economics of the modem milk business was such that a 
producer was now more than ever left at the mercy of his 
distributor. Without continuous and aggressive supervision
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by the state, exploitation was the inevitable outcome. 
Accusations of unfair treatment of producers, abuse in the 
definition of base and surplus milk, and pure extortion were 
numerous* Some distributors were allegedly preventing dairy 
farmers from joining the producers’ association by threaten­
ing to cancel their contracts.
Distributors denied many of these claims as well as
the cost survey data submitted by area producers supporting
the need for an increased producer price. The level of
suspicion among the hearing participants was high even if
20all the claims and counterclaims lacked validity.
Another example of inter-industry antagonism 
surfaced in a 19^5 legislative debate over including manu­
facturing or Class II milk under minimum price protection of 
the law. This omission in the 1959 amendments was regarded 
as controversial from the start. During Senate Agriculture 
committee hearings on a bill to correct this problem, pro­
ducers accused processors and distributors of cheating on 
their milk usage reports* They claimed that processors would 
purchase milk ostensibly for manufacturing purposes at the 
uncontrolled price but bottle it for fluid purposes and 
pocket a hefty profit. Producers also blasted some distrib­
utors for "hushing up" their producers with fears of contract 
cancellation.
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Milk distributors were outraged at these statements 
and pointed to the economic consequences of including Class 
II milk under price-fixing provisions* Higher producer 
prices for manufactured products would attract competition 
from out of the state* These same high prices might also 
discourage production of Grade A fluid milk* Despite this 
testimony, the legislature gave overwhelming approval to the 
bill * Lobbyists for the distributors got the upper hand, 
however, when Governor Tim Babcock vetoed the bill as 
unworkable and costly to administer* The producers' lobby 
had lost much of its clout when John Harrison left their 
employ to take a Supreme Court seat in i960. However, the 
bill was reintroduced in 196? and eventually enacted into 
la».22
During the early 1960s, accusations were made that 
T* p. McNulty, the board's executive secretary, was to some 
extent a "captive" of the distributor's viewpoint, although 
he was not believed to be weak and indecisive like his 
predecessor. McNulty left his position in 1964 with praise 
from his employers * His successors generally have been 
regarded as stronger administrators and sympathetic with the 
producer's plight*
The persistence of distributional inequities— whether 
perceived or real— was a common trait of the modern dairy 
industry. These difficulties would influence the development
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of milk price regulation well into the 1970s.
The 1966 Price-Fixing Scandal
A series of federal indictments handed down in late 
1966 awakened some Montanans to the economic realities of 
the modern dairy industry. Their repercussions would con­
tinue for the next few years.
The indictments concerned attempts by the Montana 
Food Distributors' Association (MFDA) an organization of 
retail food stores, and several milk processor-distributors 
to conspire illegally to fix prices on fluid and manufactured 
milk items. In 19^5 and I966, the MFDA was unsuccessful in 
convincing the Milk Control Board to raise minimum retail 
prices on certain milk products. The group then went to 
various Montana milk distributors and asked them to quote a 
suggested retail price for their products. Ideally, the new 
suggested price would be higher than the existing minimum 
retail price. According to the MFDA president, distributors 
were sympathetic with the situation of retailers* They 
feared that retailers would suffer financially without some 
kind of price increase. They feared that without an increase, 
retail stores might start their own processing plants and go 
into direct competition with the distributors. Safeway 
Stores had already begun an integrated operation of this 
type.
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The situation was decidedly more complex than the 
newspapers initially reported. Sources within the industry 
accused the MFDA of pushing the distributors into quoting 
suggested retail prices. MFDA members purportedly threatened 
them into raising their home delivery prices so as not to 
compete unfavorably with the retailers. Distributors who 
refused to comply with the arrangement would be denied shelf 
space in the retail stores to sell milk products* It must 
be remembered that nothing prevented individual retailers or 
distributors from raising their prices above the prescribed 
minimums. If one did and a competitor did not, however, the 
former would probably lose customers to the latter* To 
receive the benefits of the price increase, all parties in 
the industry had to be involved.
The federal government cried foul to this scheme in 
late 1966. A Billings federal court acted on a U.S. Depart­
ment of Justice complaint of illegal price-fixing in the 
industry. MFDA and Beatrice Foods were charged with wrong­
fully manipulating the fluid milk market. Eight distrib­
utors— Beatrice Foods, Gallatin Co-op Creamery, Equity 
Supply Co., Wilcoxson's, Best, Gate City, Medo-Land, and 
Phillips— were accused of fixing prices of various non-fluid 
milk products. All of the above-listed firms except Gate 
City, Wilcoxson's, and Phillips, and the MFDA, pleaded no 
contest to the indictments in I967 * In other words, they
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did not necessarily agree with the Justice Department that 
they had sinned, hut they would agree to sin no more! The 
MFDA, its president, and the three milk distributors were 
eventually found guilty and fined.
The propriety of several milk distribution and 
retail outlets would be in serious question during coming 
years* The consequences of the I966 incident will be dis­
cussed in Chapter VI.
1971 Amendments
Montana dairymen were able to come together again
in 1971 to obtain some common goals. The major concern of
industry spokesmen was the means by which prices were set.
Cost of production surveys were coming into serious question:
To ascertain what prices will bring a "reasonable" 
return on investment to the producers and the dealers 
of a particular market, the Milk Control Board held public and private hearings to collect cost data. To 
many this seemed like a logical approach; i.e., accu­
mulated cost data can be analyzed and a certain markup 
percentage applied to gain the desired selling price 
that will result in a reasonable return to the pro­
ducer or dealer. . . . However, accurate and reliable cost data were inconsistent. The seriously plausible statement that milk prices can be established on the 
basis of calculated costs, is a fallacy.27
The other consequence of this pricing system was 
that prices for one year were based on cost data collected 
from the previous year. The present administrator of the 
Milk Control Division examines the result;
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' # # «The dairy industry was always playing catchup,
By the time the farmer was getting the increase in o 
price under the old method, some of them were broke.
The flexible formula plan, which brought about auto­
matic changes in minimum prices as were mandated in indices 
of production, distribution, and retailing costs, was 
believed to be the proper alternative. Established formulas 
would signal cost adjustments as the economy changed. The
producer and distributor would be guaranteed an immediate
2Qchange without the need for long and complex hearings. ^
As indicated in Chapter II, the milk industry also 
sought to cover jobbers and prevent unfair extension of 
credit to retailers. A $_$00 civil penalty option was also 
added to the law as an alternative to suspension or revoca­
tion of a dealer’s license. Spokesmen for the milk lobby 
argued that a civil penalty was necessary because the board 
was often afraid to revoke a license for fear of decreasing 
the available milk supply in an area.
The amendments were easily approved in the House and 
Senate. A few conservative, rural Republicans and liberal 
Butte Democrats comprised the bulk of the opposition. The 
industry did not succeed in passing a companion bill designed 
to clarify and expand the definition of unfair trade prac­
tices* Some distributors and small retailers believed the 
bill would put them at an unfair advantage with their large 
competitors. The House Agriculture Committee agreed with
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31them, and the bill died in committee.
A single formula to set all prices was set up by the 
board in 1972 with the assistance of a New York consulting 
firm. The formula utilized eighteen indices of economic 
performances including prices received by farmers for their 
produce, prices of hay for feed, U.S. and Montana employment 
rates, and personal income estimates. If one of the indices 
registered an increase, it could have an inflating or 
deflating effect on the formula depending on what it 
measured. The same was true if the indices registered a 
decrease. The final price adjustment would be up or down 
depending on the net change in all indices.
Federal wage-price controls implemented in 1971 did 
not help the formula pricing scheme. As feed costs sky­
rocketed in 1972, the formula indicated a substantial boost 
in prices for producers. (Feed costs were not covered by 
federal price controls.) However, the total increase in 
producer prices as justified by the formula was denied by 
the federal Cost of Living Council, since the increase would 
also affect distributor prices in such a way as to put the 
amount of the increase over government guidelines. The 
board again asked for federal approval to okay a price 
increase, with the stipulation that only producers would 
receive the increase. A distributor challenged this decision 
in district court, alleging that any increase should be
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shared across the board. The judge agreed with the distrib-
33utor and quashed the board proposal.
The milk board solved this dilemma in 1973 by 
splitting the formula into two parts— one for producers, the 
other for the rest of the industry. Price increases to pro­
ducers could now be registered when they alone were justi­
fiable. The eventual removal of federal price controls also 
spared the formula approach much anguish.
Summary
The Montana dairy industry came together in 1959 and 
1971 to alter the milk control law substantially in their 
mutual interests. The years in between, though, were often 
marked with suspicion, accusation, and general ill will among 
dairymen. Yet, equity was continually built into the 
relationship by the legislature and the board. Tight report­
ing, full price protection, and sophisticated pricing tech­
niques were proposed and implemented to assist the producer. 
Although some of these changes were opposed by some distrib­
utors, others worked to further the health of the entire 
industry■
The Milk Control Board was entering a new era by the 
1970s. Favorable court decisions strengthened its resolve; 
unfavorable decisions performed a check on its errors and 
oversights. The board and the industry's credibility would 
soon come into question again, as a period of economic and 
administrative problems loomed on the horizon.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FRUSTRATIONS OF CONSUMERISM: 1973-1979
A "Consumer" Board
The mere presence of five consumers on the Montana 
Milk Control Board does not "by itself make for public repre­
sentation. If one appoints a majority of conscientious indi­
viduals who will adhere to those provisions of the law 
requiring a balanced decision on behalf of the industry and 
the public, then one has a consumer board in operation. The 
events of the past few years indicate that Montana's board 
has shown a marked consumer preference. This preference has 
yet to be transformed into meaningful action, however.^
In early 1976, the board decided to grant producer 
price increases without making similar adjustments in whole­
sale or retail prices. The board reasoned that the latter’s 
minimum prices were more than sufficient to insure their 
profitability. Individual distributors or retailers were 
always free to raise their prices above the minimums if 
their costs and consumer demand indicated such an action was 
necessary. This plan was praised by the Montana Consumer 
Affairs Council; some distributors were not too pleased.
55
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
the board decision. Ed McHugh, operator of Clover Leaf 
Dairy in Helena, indicated that many distributors were afraid 
to raise prices for fear that some firms would keep prices at 
the minimum and steal customers. A concerted effort by all 
dairies to raise prices in unison could be construed as 
price fixing; this would bring on the wrath of the Federal 
Trade Commission and the Justice Department, as was the case 
in 1966.̂
The case was settled in October in favor of the 
distributors. Judge Peter Meloy ruled that the board’s 
decision was illegal by virtue of their failure to give 
proper notice of the hearing where they made the decision 
and omission in not publishing the proposed rule in the 
Montana Administrative Register.̂  This setback would not 
constrain the board in future activities*
A March 1978 proposal to lower the minimum retail 
price by six cents per half-gallon met distributor opposi­
tion again. The milk control division administrator insisted 
that the reduction would affect only 10 percent of the 
statewide distributor sales volume ; the remaining 90 percent 
of their volume was wholesale and the proposed reduction in 
wholesale charges was but two cents. The minimum price 
could always be exceeded if need be. For example : a
distributor with rural deliveries could raise the price for 
those runs to make up for the decreases in city sales*
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Distributors were skeptical. They produced expert testimony 
claiming that many of the processors would operate at sub­
stantial losses should the board proposal become effective. 
They again raised fears of cut-throat competition by the 
major supermarket chains. The board decision was overturned
lion a legal technicality later that year. The milk division 
administrator commented rather pointedly that "it is inter­
esting to note that the board has never been challenged on 
an increase in milk rates, only on a decrease in prices."^
A final example of consumer interest on the part of 
the board has not yet come to fruition. In January 1979, 
the board unanimously adopted a motion to alter the pricing 
formula. The proposed change would consolidate three of the 
formula indices into one index, and raise the interval upon 
which increases in prices are based. The consolidation and 
interval adjustments would make the formula less volatile ; 
i.e., price increase would be less frequent. In addition to 
those changes, the permissable minimum retail markup would 
be reduced. The net change from all three adjustments would 
amount to about a six cent reduction per half-gallon of 
milk.^
Distributors have once again announced their inten­
tion to fight the proposal, citing arguments used in 197  ̂
and 1978. The board has taken the position that the public 
interest would be better served by competition at the retail
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level. They fear that non-price competition; i.e., engaging 
in unfair trade practices, is presently taking place as an 
inefficient substitute for real price competition. A public 
hearing on the board plan has been delayed twice since mid- 
April as industry and board representatives prepare testimony 
to support their positions. Questions of law and economics 
will again become entangled, and the probable outcome is 
anyone's best guess. The record of the last three years is 
not a signal of optimism.
Consumer Frustration
Although consumer complaints against selective price 
increases appear throughout the history of the Milk Control 
Board, the reported public criticism of the past few years 
has been intense. Low income groups did stage a short-lived
pboycott of milk in the early 1970s over a planned increase.
In recent months, consumer advocates have sharply questioned 
the need for further regulation of at least retail prices. 
Three opinion surveys tend to support that view.
A statewide telephone survey conducted in March 1979» 
by Frank Magid Associates of Iowa for the Lee Newspapers 
found 5^ percent of the respondents opposed to legal price 
controls. 34 percent were in favor of continuing the present 
system. A survey of the six major college campuses by the 
Montana Student Lobby in January 1979 revealed similar 
totals: 47 percent were in favor of abolishing milk price
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controls and 32 percent were opposed. The results were 
remarkably consistent between campuses ; the exception was 
Northern Montana College, where a clear majority were 
opposed to decontrol. A final survey conducted in December 
1978 by pollsters for a Great Falls radio station revealed 
that 90 percent of the local citizens were in favor of 
eliminating the Milk Control Board. Personal knowledge 
about the board was minimal, but respondents were clearly 
frustrated over the price of milk in their area.̂
A recent chorus of newspaper editorials has also
joined in demanding change. An exerpt from a Great Falls
Tribune commentary is illustrative :
The milk industry primarily distributors seems to view the pricing formula as a one-way street that 
allows prices to increase forever, but never drop 
back more than a penney. That's nice for them, but the formula has to be able to reverse itself.
Otherwise, it turns into a joke.
The joke is on the people of Montana, forced by 
state regulations to pay an unwarranted premium price 
for the elixir of cows.10
As might be expected, distributors and other dairy­
men do not take kindly to what professor Ed McHugh terms a 
despicable "kill job" on the milk i n d us tr y .T h e ir  concerns 
and agonies about the press and the public will be reviewed 
again in subsequent chapters-
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Summary
Consumer dissatisfaction with the Milk Control Board 
has been evident over the past forty years, although recently 
the frustration has reached a feverish pitch. The modern 
inflationary spiral spurred on since the Vietnam War has no 
doubt helped generate this concern. Attacks made directly 
on the board's intentions are misguided, however, since the 
board recently demonstrated a strong consumer bias. This is 
not to suggest that board members are opposed to the milk 
industry. Rather, they are motivated toward securing a 
meaningful balance of factors in their decisions. For this 
they should be commended.
The perceptions of many consumers are clearly 
aligned against the existing regulatory system. There is on 
their part an intuitive realization of the distributional 
inequities and improper internalities that plague non-market 
operations. The next chapter will explore still another non- 
market failure of the Montana Milk Control Board.
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CHAPTER V
AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF REGULATION
The Presence of Derived Externalities
Wolf suggests that government regulation to offset
market failures may promote "unanticipated side effects,
often in an area remote from that which the public policy
was intended to o p e r a t e . T h e s e  effects are called derived
externalities. Even when these externalities become apparent,
2they are not always understood or corrected. This chapter 
will survey derived externalities in the operation of the 
Milk Control Board.
Distribution Efficiency
A generally accepted measure of the efficiency of 
distributing commodities is the distributor’s gross margin 
(DGM). In the case of the milk industry, the DGM is the 
difference between what distributors pay producers for milk 
and the retail price. An examination of DGMs in Montana 
reveals some interesting statistics.
In 1976, Montana's milk DGM was considerably higher 
than those of adjacent states like Washington, Wyoming, and 
the Dakotas. Montana's DGM even exceeded California's
62
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average level ty 4? percent. Leaving DGMs aside for the 
moment and looking at net profit margins (profit as a per­
centage of a firm's net equity,) one will find that the 
national average was about 8 percent in the dairy industry 
by July 31, 1978; Montana’s average was approximately 18 
percent. Some processors do operate at considerably lower
3margins, but this average is startling.
The Milk Control Division has claimed in the past 
that transportation costs in Montana account for much of the 
high DGM. The Montana Legislative Auditor has taken excep­
tion to this assertions
Such reasoning is valid for some distribution points 
in the state, such as along the Highline and other 
rural areas. Since some milk must be transported, we would expect higher prices in these areas. However, 
the majority of milk in Montana is consumed in urban 
areas, where processing plants are nearby. Conse­quently, transportation costs should not account for 
much of the difference in DGMs . . .  I n  the adjacent 
states . . . all of which are similar to Montana in terms of population distribution problems, DGMs are 
generally lower. . . . I t is difficult to accept the 
premise that the difference in DGMs between Montana and other states is accounted for entirely by trans­
portation costs
Montana’s high DGM is more likely explained by the 
methods of distributing milk. Home delivery— a far more 
costly service than buying milk at the store— is still uti­
lized more in Montana than in most states. This would ac­
count for some of the high cost of distribution- Also, 
Montana's price-fixing statute does not allow for various 
discount delivery methods such as dock delivery. The only
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exception is on the "on-the-farm sale" which is limited in 
use. A University of Illinois study suggests that states 
like Montana which have strict and uniform resale price con­
trols will he slow to adopt cost-saving innovations in dis­
tribution.^ Even the Milk Board has recognized the possible 
inefficiencies behind high margins :
It appears that since distributors are not allowed to 
compete on the basis of price, they must compete on 
the basis of cost-increasing service and containers.
The public interest would be better served if the 
pricing system provided incentive for cost-reducinginnovation. 6
Ironically, one of the legislature's express policy 
declarations is "to make the distribution of milk between 
the producer and consumer as direct as can be efficiently 
and economically done."
"Minimum" Pricing
Economic theory suggests that prices are usually 
determined in a free market by the balance of supply and 
demand. Should an artificial force like government price- 
fixing intervene, the normal market outcomes could be 
destabilized. If, for example, a government agency sets a 
legal minimum price below the price that would prevail under 
normal market conditions, the effect is inconsequential if 
there is no stipulation that one can charge higher than the 
minimum price. Consumers will be willing to pay a higher 
price for the commodity in question and suppliers will 
insure sufficient quantities of that commodity at that price.
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On the other hand, should the government set a man­
datory minimum price above the market price, one will see 
suppliers providing more of a commodity, hut consumer demand 
will not match that supply. As unnecessary surplus will 
result. There is a net loss to society in financial terms, 
since consumers will he paying higher than normal prices for 
the commodity, and suppliers will he hearing an increased 
cost for maintaining the surplus.
The ahove situation may he occurring in Montana with
respect to minimum retail prices. The reader will remember
that in many instances, processors were individually unwilling
to raise wholesale prices ahove the minimum for fear of losing
customers. Thus, minimum wholesale prices are relatively
uniform; i.e., they are in effect maximum prices. An
inspection of grocery stores and supermarkets in any Montana
community will reveal that retail prices do not vary. (This
author knows of only one exception; see footnote.) A minimum
retail price higher than the market price is not about to he
raised any further. A retailer would he committing economic
8suicide in such a case.
When fixed prices exceed market prices, economic 
theory suggests another problem; violations of the controls 
can he expected as suppliers attempt to "heat down" the 
effective price in order to increase sales. Montana's 
prescriptions against unfair trade practices should
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theoretically solve this problem. However, Montana dairymen 
have not always been known for their strict adherence to the 
law. Board records and a report of the legislative auditor 
reveal several instances of violations. These include: (1)
selling milk and providing a milk dispenser; (2) inability 
to sell milk to certain retail outlets because the competi­
tion owns the refrigeration equipment; (3) loss of milk 
accounts because of failure to grant requested kickbacks on 
the minimum price; and (4) providing "freebies" like ice
9cream in order to obtain milk accounts.
The Milk Control Division has successfully prosecu­
ted many violations in recent years and has fined several 
businesses.Non-price competition will still continue, 
though, so long as the offender is willing to take the risk 
of being caught. The potential benefits from violation and 
the relatively small resources of the division make this 
risk minimal. The board has taken note of this problem 
during the past three years; this explains part of their 
rationale behind changing the formula to induce competition 
at the retail level.
Potential for Competitive Pricing
The milk control law does not apply to federal 
installations located in the state. Hence, a miniscule free 
market in milk exists on these facilities. The Malmstrom 
Air Base post exchange price for milk was recently reported
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to be seventy-seven cents a half-gallonî during the same
period, the civilian price was $1.0? a half-gallon. The
same discrepancies can be found between wholesale prices paid
at federal facilities and in controlled markets. The
Legislative Auditor has claimed that distributors use far
more efficient delivery methods when supplying the U.S.
government; e.g., dock delivery is used rather than stocking
of shelves. The incentive for finding efficient distribution
methods lies in the fact that distributors must bid to supply
12the federal government.
This evidence of potential competition suggests that
retail and perhaps wholesale prices could be lower in Montana
but for the presence of price controls* The wholesale price
may not be much lower, as will be explained in Chapter VI.
The legislative auditor suggested in 1976 that controls may
have set the retail price six to twelve cents higher than the
13probable market price. This paper will assess the merits 
of this contention later, as well as the reasons why distrib­
utors dispute this argument.
Milk Consumption and the Elasticity of Demand
Elasticity of demand refers to the measure of respon­
siveness of consumer demand to changes in a commodity price.
In mathematical terms, the dividing point of elasticity is 
minus one (-1). Negativity is due to the inverse relationship 
between price and quantity; i.e., if price goes up, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
quantity purchased goes down and vice versa. The closer 
elasticity of demand for a commodity approaches zero, demand 
is said to be inelastic. In other words, consumers will 
tolerate great increases in price before decreasing consump­
tion* Conversely, as elasticity approaches minus one and 
beyond, demand is elastic. Consumers will adjust consumption 
patterns for even the smallest change in price. This tool 
can help one better understand the relationship between price 
changes and consumption of milk in Montana.
A cursory review of Montana milk prices and sales 
relationships reveals that in some periods, the theoretical 
inverse relationship between price and demand does hold up.
A sample period is illustrated in Table 1 on page 69. Retail 
price-fixing can put a dent into consumption patterns, some­
thing the law was not designed to promote.
An elasticity study conducted by Montana State 
University places short-run elasticity at -.32 and long-run 
elasticity at -2.66. Thus, a 10 percent increase in price 
is associated with a 3 percent decrease in demand, in the 
short-run; in the long-run, the same increase will decrease 
consumption 2? percent. Short-run is defined as the quarter 
of the year when a price change occurs. The long-run 
represents changes after three to four years. It is implicit 
in the MSU model that consumers will not shift their consump­
tion patterns o v e r n i g h t . T h e  long-run is thus the real
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TABLE 1
MONTANA MILK PRICE AND SALES RELATIONSHIPS:
1972-1975
Price Sales
Average Price Increase Packages Increase
per half-gallon or Sales or
Calendar in 1967 Decrease of Class I Decrease
Year dollars in Price (Pounds) in Sales
1972 $ 0.503 175,095,005
1973 .520 Increase 169,466,4o6 Decrease
1974 • 554 Increase 167,394,202 Decrease
1975 .530 Decrease 173,492,612 Increase
Source: Office of the Legislative Auditor, Report on the
Need for Milk Price Regulation in Montana (Helena: Allied
Printing, December 1976 ) , p. 55*
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indicator of consumer preference.
The elasticity of demand will allow reasonable pre­
dictions on consumer overpayments and decreases in milk 
producer income in the event that minimum retail prices are 
established at higher-than-minimum prices. The loss in dairy 
farmer income is a direct result of reduced consumption of 
fluid milk. Table 2 on page 71 shows the estimated over­
payments and losses at various levels of elasticity where 
the retail price is "excessive" by twelve cents per gallon. 
The overpayments decrease as elasticity approaches minus 
one, but this indicates that milk purchases are falling and 
dairy farmer losses are increasing.
The question of where consumer overpayments are
absorbed is easily answered:
Under the present price setting procedures, some of 
the implied overpayments are channeled into the pro­cessing and distribution segment of the Montana milk 
industry . . . others are lost because milk is not 
being used at its highest and best economic use— i.e., drinking. Deregulation of resale prices would allow 
. . .  a decrease in consumer payments. This decrease 
' . . would be borne entirely by the processors and 
distributors • • • the resultant decrease in revenue 
to the processor would not necessarily be a reduction of profit but could substantially be absorbed by in­
creased efficiency in milk distribution and increased consumption.15
These conclusions tend to be upheld by other sources. 
The operator of a now-defunct processing plant has insisted 
that for every one cent per half-gal Ion increase in the price 
of milk, a store in his area could eventually expect a
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATED ANNUAL EFFECT OF A MILK PRICE 
EXCESSIVE BY TWELVE CENTS PER GALLON
Level of Demand Effect at Each Level of Elasticity
Elasticity
Decrease in 
Gallons of Milk 
Consumed
Consumer
Over­
payment
Decrease in
Producer
Income
— • 1 
-.4
- • 7
154.000
629.000 
1,128,000
$ 2,177,958 
1,422,622 
631,111
$ 80,000
327.000
587.000
Source: Office of the Legislative Auditor, Report on the
Need for Milk Price Regulation in Montana (Helena; Allied 
Printing, December 1976), P* 58* (Data compiled from 
statistics from the Milk Control Division.)
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l62| percent decrease in volume sold.
Consumption patterns and milk prices have been
involved in a dynamic process through the years. A short-run
increase in milk purchases may deceive one as to its long-
1 7run consequences. ' Even a sustained increase in sales may 
he lower than the level possible under market pricing. Of 
course, the availability of substitutes for milk and changing 
perceptions of its necessity in the human diet have their 
effects. If regulation is to be continued, there is a pre­
sumption in favor of watching retail prices very carefully 
so as not to upset the stability of the entire industry.
This would seem to be part of the board's rationale for 
trying to induce some competition into retail markets.
Producer Price Dilemmas
The review of pricing externalities has so far con­
cerned resale prices* Producer price-fixing is subject to 
derived externalities also, as the following examination 
indicates•
One fear of producers and regulators is that pro­
ducer prices may be so high as to attract raw milk from 
out-of-state. Evidence of this problem exists; during a 
i960 dairy industry conference, several eastern Montana 
producers expressed the belief that recent producer price 
increases had made their part of the state an oasis for
1 Qsurplus milk from North Dakota. Transportation was no
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longer seen as a barrier to these local farmers.
Out-of-state shipments can be controlled by requir­
ing inspection under the Montana Food and Drug laws and a 
dealer's license. This can prevent "bootleg" shipments and 
control the flow of commerce. These are not substitutes for 
diligence on the part of the board and industry in develop­
ing a producer price formula sensitive to potential trade 
from nearby states. To this end, the provision in the law 
requiring the board to consider prices in neighboring and 
adjacent states is a suitable incentive.
Another form of derived externality in producer 
pricing is the problem of using cost survey data to establish 
minimum tariffs. It was suggested earlier that the use of 
such data opens up regulators to inconsistent decisions and 
dangerous time-lags. Montana has solved this problem with 
the use of flexible formulas. If a formula is generating 
uneconomical prices, it can always be adjusted by the board 
after petition and public hearing.
Summary
The replacement of the market with government regula­
tion has not been a panacea for market failures. Regulation 
in Montana has created difficulties unforeseen by early 
advocates of the Milk Control Act. Inefficiencies in distri­
bution, the possibility of excess retail pricing, illegal 
non-price competition, fluctuating rates of consumption.
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and sensitive producer prices do not work to the benefit of 
the industry or the consumer. Deregulation— at least at 
the level of retail prices— is preferred by some as the only 
acceptable alternative to the status quo.
In later chapters, the author will assess the polit­
ical acceptability of deregulation. For the meantime, it is 
important to understand the views of the modem industry and 
the regulators on the Milk Control Act. This will be the 
subject of Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER VI
INDUSTRY AND BOARD VIEWS OF THE LAW
A New Economic Order
Edwin Briggs has captured the essence of the dairy
industry's views on regulation in the following observation
of a milk price hearing:
There was not even an echo from the past of the 
sentiment that industry should not be regulated or 
that efforts should be made either to restore or to 
maintain as much as possible of the principle of the 
free market. Everyone present apparently had been conditioned completely to think and to act within 
the framework of a very strict system of market and 
price controls— though, of course, this does not mean that all groups agreed as to how far the board 
should dictate the nature of or regulate the pro- ducer-distributor relationship. But judging from 
the views expressed in this hearing, the milk industry 
appears to be irretrievably lost to free enterprise 
and the free market. The very idea of competition seemed strange and out of place in this setting.^
What specific fears does the industry have about a
deregulated market? Do they view the world like their
predecessors of the 1930s? How valid are their views? This
chapter will attempt to answer these questions.
Industry Views of Regulation
Montana milk dealers continue to accept the basic 
philosophy that prompted enactment of the first control law 
in 1935* For example: Everett Hartman, owner of Skyline
77
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Dairy in Kalispell, "believes that deregulation of resale 
prices would be the financial undoing of him and his 
competitors. Although he is a processor-distributor, he, 
like many associates, believes that without complete price 
control, instability in retail markets would be shifted 
back to the distributor and in turn to producers. That is 
why Hartman views retail control "as the stabilizing force 
of the law." Similarly, Hartman and his fellow distribu­
tors and producers believe that economic exploitation of 
consumers is a fallacy. The only alternative to milk 
control— deregulation— is a loaded proposition.^
The industry's concerns can be grouped into three 
categories. The first fear of dairymen is that deregula­
tion of Montana resale prices would encourage the "dumping" 
of surplus milk from adjacent states. They reason that 
surplus milk would be hauled into Montana and sold at 
lower prices despite higher transportation costs. Out-of- 
state dealers would still find themselves with a decent 
profit margin— better than one achieved by marketing 
surplus milk in their own states. Competition from out-of- 
state milk would be so intense as to drive some Montana 
milkmen out of business.^
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It will be recalled that a similar argument was made 
regarding producer prices. It should also be remembered that 
out-of-state milk shipments must be inspected under pure 
food and drug laws. An out-of-state dealer must also be 
licensed in Montana. A Milk Control Division official 
insists that processing a license application for an out-of- 
state seller could take up to two years. Thus, potential 
competition from adjacent states cannot be immediate in 
impact.^
Imports may not occur for two additional reasons 
despite the supposed advantages- Montana producer prices 
are or at least should by law be comparable to those of 
adjacent states. Price competition at this level may 
therefore, be unlikely. It is difficult to imagine 
"surplus" milk entering the state when there is no price 
advantage. Many Montana distributors also enjoy a natural 
transportation-location advantage over out-of-state firms. 
This advantage tends to obviate the fear of interstate 
competition. Something must also be said for consumer sup­
port of local brand-name products.̂
A second fear of the industry is the arrival of 
higher prices for rural and home delivery and in small store 
sales. Under deregulation, one would expect to see higher 
prices for milk on these more costly delivery runs. 
Deregulation would likely raise the retail price in small
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stores since they could not he expected to handle large 
volume discounts that would he available to larger super­
markets. These higher prices are considered undesirable for 
several reasons* Many processors cringe at the burden 
higher prices would place on low income and senior citizens 
as well as the general public* Some small retail stores 
believe that they will be undersold by the supermarkets 
since milk is now one of their biggest selling items; price 
competition would cut deeply into their profit margins * ̂
The expectation of higher prices from costly distrib­
ution m n s  is valid; this is true of nearly every commodity. 
However, it is wrong to assume that retail prices would 
automatically be higher than the fixed minimum prices now 
observed * A range of retail prices would be an obvious
outcome. The actual prices will depend on market forces,
8and they could be higher or lower*
As far as detrimental effects on low income and 
senior citizens are concerned, analysis of the real world 
bears close attention. Agricultural and welfare officials 
have found that most low income and senior citizens patron­
ize larger supermarkets rather than the small convenience 
stores or home delivery service* About 85 percent of the 
food stamps in Montana are used in large supermarkets, and 
14 percent are used in large local grocery stores or conve­
nience marts* Only 1 percent of the stamps are used to pay
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for milk on home delivery. Since lower deregulated retail 
prices would be most common in the large supermarkets and 
grocery stores, the majority of destitute Montanans would 
reap some benefits. Horae delivery will not be generally 
available to many low income people, because distributors 
often regard these people as possible credit risks.^
Ironically, many low income organizations and some 
outspoken senior citizens do not see resale price controls 
working to their advantage. Several representatives of 
these groups have testified in favor of some form of 
decontrol, viewing the present system as a deck stacked in 
favor of the stores and the middlemen. Even a small 
decrease in the retail price of one gallon of milk adds up 
to big savings over the course of a year's purehases.
Would the small retailer suffer from adverse price 
competition from larger chains? This is not easily predict­
able. If sales and turnover of milk are now quite high as 
has been claimed, competition may not have too adverse 
effect on profits. Convenience stores also benefit from a 
traffic that finds grocery shopping impossible or inconve­
nient. Should retail prices in Montana ever be deregulated, 
this situation would bear some close observation.^^
Perhaps the greatest concern of the many independent 
processor-distributors is that large multistate corporations 
and chain supermarkets would engage in predatory pricing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
practices to increase their share of the market and eventu­
ally drive the independents out of business. Predatory 
practices would probably include so-called "weekend specials 
or use of milk as a loss leader to attract customers. The 
larger firms would supposedly even sell milk below cost in 
order to perpetuate their subterfuge. The market would 
ultimately consist of a few large firms charging higher
prices. This reasoning allows Everett Hartman to conclude
T 2that "controls preserve competition" in Montana.
An inspection of milk distributors now operating in 
Montana reveals that the number of firms is already quite 
limited. The national milk distributing chain, Beatrice 
Foods, owns three processing plants. Safeway Stores Inc., 
an interstate grocery chain, operates one processing plant 
in Butte. Albertson’s, another large food chain, has pro­
posed buying raw milk from a Bozeman firm, shipping it to 
Riverton, Wyoming for processing and packaging, and selling 
it as Janet Lee brand milk in all Albertson's stores. A 
Helena district judge recently ruled that Albertson's would 
not need a license to deal in milk, since the law does not 
mention firms which handle all their own operations- This
13decision is currently on appeal to the state Supreme Court. 
Table 3 on page 83 lists each plant and its percentage share 
of the total Class I milk sales in pounds for April 1978 and 
April 1979.
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TABLE 3
MARKET SHARES OF MONTANA PROCESSORS, 
APRIL 1978 AND APRIL 1979
Share of Total Class I Sales 
(in P ounds)
Marketing Area Plant April 1978 April 1979
2, 8, 10 *Beatrice Foods 35.5̂ 40.7^1 Gallatin Co-op 16.1 15.82 Jersey Creamery 11.0 10.0
11 Safeway, Inc. 9.8 8.86 Vita-Rich 8.7 7.8
9 Equity Supply 5-0 5.5
9 Skyline Dairy 3-4 3.812 Cloverleaf Dairy 3-7 3.8
5 Gate City Dairy 3.3 3.110 Consolidated Dairies 3*5 out-of-business10 Ravalli County
Creamery not-in-business 0.7
TOTAL : 100.0^ 100.0^
*Beatrice Foods operates in Great Falls, Billings, and
Missoula. In April 1979» their respective shares of themarket were 15-0^, 11.9^, and 13.89s.
Consolidated Dairies of Ronan had its business picked up by 
other western Montana processors•
Source: Data compiled from worksheets, Milk Control
Division, Department of Business Regulation, June 1979 -
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Clearly, Beatrice Foods and the Gallatin Co-op 
Creamery already control over 50 percent of the fluid milk 
market in Montana. The pattern is like that throughout the 
nation; i.e., the processing-distribution industry has 
become an oligopoly. An oligopoly is characterized by many 
firms, but not so many that they are unaware of each other’s 
market activities. Usually there is one dominant firm which 
serves as a price leader. Note that Beatrice alone controls 
41 percent of the market. Firms in an oligopolistic 
industry tend toward stability with little or no price 
competition. The price leader would usually avoid over­
pricing its product, since there exists enough competition 
to underprice it and capture part of its market. The leader 
is subject to larger sales losses in a price war. If all 
firms would agree to raise prices in conjunction with the 
leader, the higher price could be maintained. The major 
difference between Montana's oligopoly and that of many other 
states is that most states do not have resale price controls.
If wholesale price deregulation were phased in under 
the given market structure, would predatory pricing or 
monopolistic price gouging become a reality? There is much 
evidence to suggest this would not be the case. First, 
oligopolies have a natural tendency in the direction of 
price stability as was indicated in the previous paragraph. 
Any concerted action to raise prices in the absence of
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normal market factors could be interpreted as a violation of 
federal antitrust law. Remember the results of such a uni­
form action in I966.
Second, cutthroat competition by Beatrice or Safeway 
can be considered unlikely. Beatrice is watched very closely 
by the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of 
Justice. In I966, Beatrice was found guilty of violating 
federal antitrust laws by virtue of their attempted monop­
olization of the national dairy industry. The FTC ordered 
divestiture of four major operations including their Missoula 
plant. (Under the terms of a consent decree adopted in 1967, 
Beatrice alternately gave up a number of creameries located 
in the southwestern U.S.) The commission noted that 
Montana's market was already highly concentrated in the 
early 1960s when the number of processors was far greater 
than 1979* Any price cutting or mergers with the intent of 
undermining competition would be an open violation of the 
law. There is no reason to believe that the FTC or the 
Justice Department would not respond accordingly. The same 
would be true of Safeway, which has also been found guilty of 
antitrust violations outside Montana.
The willingness to ignore the law, despite the 
consequences, cannot be left undiscussed. It has been 
stated that many Montana distributors and retailers have 
violated state unfair trade laws in the past. It is
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possible that someone could attempt predatory practices with 
the hope of grabbing an immediate financial gain before the 
state or federal government intervenes* There are several 
ways in which federal trade regulation policies could be 
supplemented. One is the presence of Montana’s Antitrust 
Bureau in the state Department of Justice. Another would be 
the requirement of posting all prices with the state. 
Distributors would have to file their exact prices with the 
Milk Control Board. Competitors and the regulators could 
then easily observe unfair pricing practices. Posting is 
now required in Colorado, it has been successful in catching 
major infractions on the state's unfair trade practice 
rules. Still another protective device would be a legal 
provision against sales below cost. This law is utilized in 
several states without resale price controls as a means of 
protecting competition.^^
Distributors operating under price controls probably 
forget that when facing competitive pressures, there will be 
an incentive to seek more efficient methods of distribution. 
Capitalizing on this incentive could insure successful opera­
tion at even lower DGMs. Consumers would benefit from these 
increased efficiencies* Thus, any competition which might 
take place among distributors may not have detrimental conse­
quences unless inefficient firms are unable to cope with the 
rest of the market.
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In addition to the arguments presented on past pages, 
some segments of the dairy industry have argued that deregu­
lation of the resale level would wipe out independent 
jobbers. The author recalls the almost tearful display of 
one Missoula jobber before a committee considering decontrol 
legislation. He found it unconscionable that anyone would 
seriously consider undermining his business- Under deregu­
lation, jobbers in the larger cities could have a rough time. 
However, since most jobbers are located in small communities 
where milk will continue to be demanded, the accusation that 
all jobbers would disappear is pure speculation.^^
The dairy industry as a whole has taken a rather 
pessimistic view of the thought of any eventual price reduc­
tions. It notes with some glee that over the past few years, 
while the index of all consumer prices has jumped over 
100 percent, milk has averaged only an 88-89 percent change. 
Former State Sen. Terry Murphy suras up the typical milk 
dealers perspectives
I t is an unfounded hope to think decontrol will bring any long-term reduction in the retail price of milk.
I’ve been trying to think of any necessary consumer 
items that have gotten cheaper lately in this time of 
inflation. Automobiles certainly haven't. Petroleum 
hasn't. Housing and clothing certainly haven't. 
Appliances aren t going down in price. How can anyone 
seriously expect food to get cheaper? Of course its 
the "impossible dream-"I?
While there is an element of truth in the above 
argument, one should remind the dairymen that they are
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avoiding some important facts. The use of CPI data is 
deceiving; is it really appropriate to compare the rather 
large increase in the price of one commodity— milk— with an 
average of increases in several commodities, including some 
which are probably not applicable to Montanans? Is it right 
for consumers regardless of their economic status to 
acquiesce in the inflationary cycle over which they have 
little control? Is it wrong to question prices which are 
based on inefficiencies? Why should a society seriously 
accept the consequences of distributional inequities? The 
milk industry should engage in more responsible debate and 
not beg the question of deregulation.
Views of the Regulators
The present administrator of the Milk Control 
Division has expressed personal reservation^ about major 
deregulation proposals. Resale price regulation would in 
his estimation lead to the end of Montana’s dairy industry. 
Milk would be supplied to the state from nearby supply 
points like Spokane and Fargo; most local producers will 
have felt the backlash of economic destruction at the resale 
level. Beatrice and Safeway would dominate the distribution 
and retail sectors. Consumers would then pay a dear price 
for their milk.
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The administrator is equally concerned over the 
board's ability to regulate milk prices under existing 
procedures. He has criticized the Administrative Procedures 
Act for shackling the board’s capacity to respond speedily 
and appropriately to needed price changes. This lack of 
independence does not work to the advantage of the consumer 
or the milk industry.Unfortunately for this point of 
view, the Act is probably here to stay. While designed to 
protect procedural rights of parties in a systematic and 
equitable manner, the APA forces us to pay a necessary cost 
in time and independence. It is possible that future 
reforms may find some solutions to its application, but that 
solution cannot and should not encompass arbitrary and 
capricious actions by administrative agencies.
Members of the Milk Control Board have also expressed 
opinions on deregulation. Two present board members, Curtis 
Cook and Ed Ward, have come to support resale price decontrol 
in conjunction with prohibitions against predatory practices. 
Another member, Ken Mortag, has expressed along the lines of 
the division administrator. Mortag believes that decontrol 
would work to the consumer’s disadvantage. Prices are not 
unnaturally high now anyway, and producers are doing well, 
so why change the system. The entire board membership has 
endorsed a modest, in-house decontrol bill aimed at retail 
prices. This bill would also strengthen unfair trade
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practice rules and give the board standby authority to
regulate retail prices in the event of severe instabilities.
This plan was designed to head off more ambitious decontrol
measures prepared for the 1979 legislature. The fate of
20this bill will be discussed in the next chapter.
Industry and Regulator View the Consumer
The author has indicated that the Milk Control Board 
has a definite bias in favor of consumers. One may ask how 
the industry views consumer opinion— especially those com­
plaints over milk prices that have become more pronounced in 
recent years.
Terry Murphy’s comment of a few pages back implies 
a certain sympathy with the consumer's plight. The 
industry's concern that deregulation would destroy compe­
tition and push prices far beyond current levels also implies 
that dealers may be interested in maintaining a system which 
works in the consumer interest. Thus, it would seem safe to 
conclude that most producers and distributors are legimately 
concerned. Disagreement about milk control are grounded in 
perspectives which desire similar goals but different means 
to achieve them.
The above argument is somewhat simplistic. The 
author's personal experiences with some members of the milk 
lobby in 1979 have led him to conclude that some distributors 
are especially callous when it comes to consumer complaints.
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Some of these individuals and their legislator supporters 
were considerably disturbed by the author’s support of two 
deregulation bills* Of course, this observation may prove 
incorrect; it is very difficult to correctly ascertain their 
motives*
An interesting viewpoint of many dairymen and some 
of the board members is that so-called consumer complaints 
are infrequent and overstated. They base their opinion on
21the fact that few consumers ever testify at board hearings*
(A few also question the wisdom of ill-informed citizens 
making judgments about a highly technical and complex 
industry *)
These views represent a gross misunderstanding of 
regulatory politics. The average citizen is not always 
capable of leaving his or her job or family even for a short 
time to appear at a milk price hearing. Neither do all 
individuals have or take the time to understand all the 
details of the regulatory process; nor does the industry or 
the regulator spend much time advertising the subject of 
regulation. These factors do not make consumer complaints 
"infrequent" or "overstated;" rather, intervening variables 
usually prevent the consumer, industry and regulator from 
meeting face-to-face* Consumers can be faulted to some 
extent for not expanding their horizons beyond their private 
lives in order to deal with forces which affect them. This
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fault does not deny the validity of their complaints? the 
survey data proves that point.
In the final analysis, consumerism is a form of 
public good. Individual consumers may be unwilling to seek 
certain goals because there is no expectation of reward or 
recognition. Because the individual faces other costly 
activities, he leaves the achievement of public goals to 
his neighbor, who in turn leaves it to his neighbor etc.
If individuals can organize into an effective mass lobby, 
the costs of achieving public purposes can be minimized. 
Effective organization will ultimately be necessary to assure 
adequate representation before the Montana Milk Control 
Board.
Summary
The Montana dairy industry adamantly opposes 
deregulation. It perceives such a change as radically 
destructive of the peace and vitality it has enjoyed during 
the past forty years. Its position is somewhat logical, for 
the perceived comforts of regulation appear advantageous 
when compared with some of the uncertainties of change.
This position is shared by some of those individuals charged 
with the duties of regulation.
Policy analysis suggest that industry perceptions 
are for the most part untenable. Fears of out-of-state 
competition and unnaturally high prices are unfounded or
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overly simplistic. Monopolization is unlikely given legal 
and economic constraints- While price competition at the 
wholesale level may be less frequent under deregulation, due 
to oligopolistic conditions in the industry, there is no 
reason why price-stickiness should be countenanced by 
government. In fact, the "perceived comforts" of regulation 
may be detrimental to the industry’s ultimate benefit.
The existence of derived externalities as discussed 
here and in the previous chapter have driven forces other 
than the board to seek major reforms* The history of this 
movement will be reviewed in Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER VII
LEGISLATORS V. THE LAW: THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION
Reform as Deregulation
In Chapter II it was shown how the milk control law 
was "improved" over the course of forty years- The changes 
that were made were but one type of suggested reform. Since 
1937* the Montana legislature has considered several versions 
of reform that would repeal the law or at least inject 
competitive elements into its administration.
Early Proposals
An attempt was made to kill the infant regulatory 
program in 1937 » H. H- Longenecker, a Republican State 
Representative from Hamilton, introduced a bill to dissolve 
the Milk Control Board and permanently suspend its activities 
The dairy interests in Longenecker’s district had been 
vehemently opposed to the 1935 law. Milk industry spokesmen 
from the rest of the state obviously had a different point 
of view; after a lengthy public hearing where pro-control 
forces were clearly in the majority, the House committee on 
dairying killed the bill unanimously.̂
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Opponents of the board were silent until 1951t when 
State Rep. Ed Foley (D-Butte) introduced another repeal mea­
sure. Unfortunately there are no available records of public 
hearings on the bill. All that is documented is that the 
bill met a swift death in the House Agriculture Committee. 
During the 1957 crisis over the milk board activities, State 
Sen. Micheal Ruane (D-Deer Lodge) introduced a repeal mea­
sure in the old State Boards Committee. Apparently Ruane 
hoped for a better hearing from this less agriculturally- 
oriented group. However, the bill was promptly re-referred 
to the Senate Agriculture Committee for its formal presenta­
tion. In his testimony, Ruane accused distributors of 
manipulating the milk board for their selfish ends. Board 
decisions were deemed arbitrary and unfair. Ruane also 
criticized the board for what he termed "rude" treatment of 
his constituents at a recent Anaconda price hearing. Except 
for a rather gruff implication from one of the committee 
members that Ruane knew nothing about dairying, there was no 
substantive discussion by the committee. Accepting the 
advice of milk industry lobbyists, the bill was unanimously 
killed.^
Another repeal bill was promoted in 19^3 by Ruane's 
successor. Sen. Luke McKeon, and two conservative 
Republicans, Sen. J .  S. Brenner of Beaverhead and A. R. 
McDonnell of Sweet Grass* This bill died in the Senate
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A New Era of Change
The next set of deregulation proposals appeared in 
the early 1970s. State Sen. Paul BoyIan (D-Gallatin), a 
former dairy farmer who had won an earlier court case 
against the milk board, called for the abolition of milk 
control laws in 1971 » His bill died in committee as did its 
predecessors. The new formula pricing bill was seen as the 
better alternative. Boylan made an abortive attempt to have
the entire Senate consider the bill on second reading, but
hhis motion was soundly defeated.
In 1973 and 1975» Sen. Neil Lynch (D-Butte) tried a 
different approach to deregulation. He sponsored three bills 
which would have given the board authority to establish dif­
ferent price formulas for different methods of delivery.
Home delivery rates would thus be set higher than normal 
retail store or dock delivery prices. The milk industry saw 
this as opening the floodgate to total deregulation. The 
first proposal, SB 379» died in the Senate Business and 
Industry Committee. Lynch could only muster fourteen 
senators to favor his proposal on the floor of the Senate.
A second attempt to consider the bill in 197^ was ruled 
invalid by the rules committee; legislative procedures did 
not allow for a bill to be reintroduced if it had been killed 
in the same session. (The 1973-197^ legislature constituted
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one session.) A final stab was taken with SB 286 in 1975* 
During hearings, Safeway Stores indicated support for the 
bill. The bill died in committee again at the request of 
dairy lobbyists.^
Another deregulation measure was introduced in the 
197^ House by Norris Nichols (R-Stevensville) and Larry 
Fasbender (D-Fort Shaw.) Both men had been sponsors of the 
flexible formula pricing bill in 1971 » Their new proposal 
would have decontrolled only resale prices; it died on a 
massive adverse committee report. Another House measure in 
1975 sought an interim study of the milk control law. It 
failed 76-19* The resolution was supported by several 
Republicans and a few Democrats. Among the supporters were 
Harold Robbins (D-Roundup,) a creamery operator, and Howard 
Ellis (R-Missoula,) a small grocery store owner.^
The decontrol bills introduced during the early 
1970s came at a time when consumer frustration with milk 
prices was not yet strong. Dairy industry lobbyists had an 
easy time convincing house and senate committees that change 
was unnecessary and potentially harmful. The majority of 
legislators did not see the matter as controversial and 
readily adopted the adverse committee reports of their 
colleagues. With the coming of the 1977 legislature, events 
would take a new direction.
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Decontrol Proposals in the 1977 and 1979 Legislatures
The Legislative Auditor's Office had published a 
controversial report in late 1976 criticizing the need for 
milk price regulation* Agreeing with the auditor that 
major changes were needed in the law, two Democrat legisla­
tors took the initiative in sponsoring those changes. Rep. 
Jerry Metcalf (D-Helena) and Sen* Robert Watt (D-Missoula) 
drew up separate and unique proposals* Sen* Watt's bill 
abolished wholesale and retail price controls, but gave the 
Milk Control Board standby powers to implement them on a 
temporary basis in the event of serious economic instability. 
His bill would also have prohibited sales below cost and 
required retailers to obtain a license before selling milk. 
Retail licensure had been recommended by the auditor and the 
Milk Control Board as a method of controlling unfair trade 
practices in the milk industry. Should a retailer be found
guilty of initiating or abetting an unfair trade practice,
8his license to sell milk could be revoked.
Rep. Metcalf's bill differed in many respects. 
Although his plan would have required retail licensure and 
prohibited the sale of milk as a loss leader, deregulation 
was extended only to jobber prices. The price-fixing powers 
of the board would continue, although the board would set 
maximum and nor minimum prices. Under such a system, 
distributors and retailers might have had some incentive to
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compete on a price basis* One dealer could try and raise 
his price to the maximum, but if his competitors did not 
follow suit, he could face sales losses*^
Watt's and Metcalf's optimism that some reforms 
could be accomplished were not matched by the requisite 
number of votes* Milk industry lobbyists packed the commit­
tee rooms with dairymen who recited tales of economic woe 
should the existing law be changed. Except for the sponsor 
and a few random consumers, the Senate Agriculture and the 
House Business and Industry Committees killed the two bills * 
The full House adopted its adverse committee report 66-19, 
with liberal-progressive Democrats forming the bulk of the 
opposition. The Senate adopted its committee recommendation
Promising a tougher legislative fight in 1979»
Rep. Metcalf planned an even more ambitious change in the 
milk control law. HB 292, introduced in the early days of 
the Forty-Sixth Legislature, sought decontrol of all prices 
in the milk industry. It also provided for strict prohibi­
tions against certain unfair trade practices including sales 
below cost. Metcalf's hope that many consumers would support 
the bill in committee were short-lived. Only a few individ- 
als arrived to endorse the measure. Organized milk lobby­
ists lambasted HB 292 as dangerous and irresponsible. For 
the first time since 1935, however, a legislative committee
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disagreed with the milk industry. On a narrow majority 
vote, the House Business and Industry Committee gave the 
bill a do-pass recommendation and sent it to the full House. 
Liberal Democrats and a few Republicans provided the major 
support for HB 292 in committee.
The House did an about-face on the measure, killing 
it 60-33• Liberal Democrats were joined by a few urban 
Republicans in endorsing the bill, but the sentiments of 
rural Democrats and Republicans were too overwhelming for 
the decontrol cause. The Business and Industry Committee 
then sent another decontrol bill to the floor. HB 526, 
sponsored by Ken Nortvedt (R-Bozeman,) was less ambitious in 
scope ; it called only for the elimination of retail price- 
fixing powers. It resembled to some extent the proposal 
endorsed by the Milk Control Board in late 1978. Before 
sending it to the floor, the committee broadened it to 
include wholesale price deregulation. The committee vote 
was again not representative of the full House's feelings. 
Another lopsided vote similar to the first spelled doom for 
the bill.^^
A senate bill revising the milk control laws—
SB 365— received a hearing in the Senate Agriculture Commit­
tee but was killed at the sponsor's request when the House 
defeated both of its bills. As introduced by Sen. Paul 
Boylan, SB 3^5 would have abolished the Milk Control Board
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and replaced it with a milk marketing administrator. This 
individual was empowered to set minimum retail prices on an 
emergency basis. Producer and wholesale price controls 
would not have been lifted. Some dairymen were disturbed at 
the idea of replacing the five-member board with a single 
official ; one processor, Ed McHugh, was apparently delighted 
with the prospect as he believed it would be easier to 
"deal” (l) with an administrator.^^
Analysis of Legislative Attitudes
Despite the apparently strong sentiments for price 
deregulation, reform-minded legislators have been unable to 
press their case beyond the committee room. Consumer repres­
entation at these hearings has been small; industry lobbies 
have been large and skillfully orchestrated. The legisla­
tive arena is little different than that of a milk board 
hearing. Industry is carefully organized to protect its 
interest while consumers generally rely on low income citi­
zens, university students and chance passers-by. The public 
goods problem discussed previously is rampant.
There are some interesting conclusions to be made 
about legislative attitudes on milk price control. It is 
overly simplistic to categorize the division of opinions 
along urban/rural lines. Urban legislators from both parties 
have formed the core of support for deregulation, but there 
are intervening variables which tend to dilute this core.
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Why, for example, have many Republicans supported 
the milk control law? Political novices have suggested that 
this support runs counter to the free enterprise ethic so 
often endorsed by that party. The author has a theory which 
may explain this apparent contradiction. First, opinions 
and beliefs about free enterprise are nebulous and multi­
faceted. Many proponents of the general concept are willing 
to allow for exceptions in their own businesses, especially 
when the market is not producing results in their favor.
Adam Smith recognized this fact as early as 1776. There is 
a good argument in suggesting that milk dealers are not 
subject to the same conditions as are other markets. That 
case was made in Chapter I. Regardless of the motivations, 
the argument is often made that one’s own enterprise should 
not be subject to the discipline of the market.
Second, many dairymen are quite possibly Republicans. 
Republican legislators may be aware of this distinction and 
identify with their economic plight through the medium of 
party comradery. Along these same lines, it should be 
remembered that the milk lobby is generally the only group 
present in legislative hearings. Their arguments sound very 
convincing without a critique from organized decontrol
1 iiadvocates.
The unwillingness of some Republicans to endorse 
deregulation may have been due to the fear of federal
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control. Should all price controls be lifted or break down, 
producers have the option of seeking protection of their 
prices through a federal government milk marketing order.
(This program will be explained in Chapter VIII.) Many 
Republicans turn livid when they see anything with the word 
"federal" stamped on it. The author is convinced after con­
versations with some Republican legislators that they accept 
state control of milk prices as the lesser of two evils
Urban Democrats have in recent years more closely 
identified with consumer interests. Their suspicion of 
industry domination of the milk control process also accounts 
for their support of deregulation. These legislators do not 
have a bone to pick with small dairy producers. They are 
concerned with preserving small businesses in Montana, but 
have no desire to give unjust and uneconomic protection to 
the middleman.
Summary
The decontrol constituency has had its roots primar­
ily in urban legislators who believe milk control to be an 
abysmal statement of economic realities. While support for 
deregulation crosses party lines, it is not enough to 
counteract the well-organized and convincing dairy lobby. 
Consumer groups display their pent-up frustrations in letters 
to the editor and telephone surveys, and not where it would 
have the most impact— in legislative and administrative
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lobbying. Before deregulation or other reforms will come 
about, advocates of change will have to translate their 
knowledge into practical political power.
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CHAPTER VIII
ALTERNATIVES TO EXISTING REGULATION
Varieties of Change
Previous chapters have listed many arguments advanced 
in favor of removing price controls. Many of the dairymen’s 
doubts about decontrol were claimed to be unfounded. Some 
of former arguments have been drawn from the experiences of 
several states that have undergone deregulation in past 
years. It is instructive to view these varied experiences 
with an eye on possible changes in Montana. Decontrol of at 
least resale price controls has been pursued by a number of 
states since the 1950s. Less than ten states now control 
resale prices. Producer price controls have remained virtu­
ally untouched due to the peculiarities of the producer/ 
distributor relationship.̂
Virginia, Georgia, Louisiana and California have 
relaxed much of their price-fixing power during the past 
twelve years. The results have been mixed. Virginia 
repealed retail price controls in 197^* Volume discounts 
are now observable in many areas of the state- Retail 
prices are relatively flexible with weekend specials being
109
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the common price-saving technique. Virginia law also allows 
for temporary standby powers to correct massive price insta­
bilities. This power was used twice to restore retail 
prices to levels above producer prices in two marketing 
areas. Although five processing plants closed by 1976,
regulators attributed the shutdowns to a number of factors
2aside from retail price deregulation.
Georgia’s price-fixing laws were declared unconsti­
tutional in the late 1960s. Price wars did not occur in the 
state as a consequence, but retail prices did measure an 
increase over the past ten years. Processor-distributors 
have continued to depart from the industry at a rate that 
prevailed under price controls. The markets have remained
3relatively stable.
Louisiana's first decontrol plan applied only to 
retail prices, but allowed discounts on various methods of 
wholesale delivery. Retail prices dropped some fourteen 
cents per half-gallon; supermarkets offered the most compe­
tition. After administrative problems damaged the wholesale 
price scheme, it was repealed by the 1976 legislature. 
Wholesale prices are now allowed to float, and sales below 
cost— defined as 106 percent of producer prices— are 
prohibited.̂
California's minimum retail price controls were 
temporarily suspended in the San Francisco area by the state
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director of the Food and Agriculture Department in January 
1977' The impetus for change came from consumers and a 
cooperative food store in San Francisco; both complained 
that high milk prices were discouraging consumption. The 
test suspension reportedly saved consumers between $50 and 
$100 million. Producers did not suffer although the profits 
of the major supermarket chains were reduced. Small pro­
cessors were also able to compete effectively according to 
government officials. The last available information to the 
author indicated that all retail controls were lifted by the 
end of 1977'̂
On the matter of the processing industry, various 
studies have contended that resale price regulation has been 
associated with a greater number of plants and that rela­
tively inefficient processors are protected. These firms 
are guaranteed a higher profit margin to compensate for the 
lack of innovation. A Federal Trade Commission report, 
however, contends that smaller-size operations can survive 
profitably under deregulation due to limited competition or 
transportation advantages. Idaho is one example of this 
phenomenon; twenty-four small and medium sized plants are 
able to thrive in this small state.̂
Deregulation, then can produce a mixed bag of results 
In some states retail price competition and lower prices are 
manifest. Instabilities have occurred in some states that
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have prompted temporary government supervision. Many pro­
cessors and distributors have survived the changes ; others 
have disappeared due to inefficient operations condoned by 
price controls. Determining factors appear to be population, 
location, transportation costs, efficiency of operation, and 
the market structure of the processing-distribution industry.
There is no reason to believe that Montana could not 
achieve a level of deregulated stability similar to adjacent 
states, provided that certain checks and balances are built 
into the system- A proposal encompassing these goals will 
be presented in Chapter XI.
Federal Milk Marketing Orders
In advocating the total elimination of Montana’s 
present milk control law, Rep. Jerry Metcalf attempted to 
console producers with the fact that they could always seek 
a federal milk marketing order (FMMO) to protect their 
prices. An FMMO is a regulation issued by the U.S. Secretary 
of Agriculture requiring processors to pay no less than 
certain minimum prices established according to use of the 
milk. The order is established after a public hearing on 
market conditions in a given area. The secretary's order 
becomes effective only after the producers approve it in a 
referendum. Much of the United States is covered by some 
fifty-five PMMOs. The orders differ little in purpose from 
existing producer price controls in Montana.̂
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An FMMO could be utilized in Montana under a scheme 
of total deregulation. Local dairymen are not too keen on 
the idea of federal assistance, however. Wholesale prices 
are not regulated under these orders, and distributors are 
opposed to any system without resale price protection. 
Producers have also expressed misgivings about the program. 
Should decontrol come about, time amassed in holding a public 
hearing, determining the basis for an order, and conducting 
a referendum could take many months. During this time, 
uncontrolled producer markets would be destabilized and the 
new marketing order would take effect in a state with few if 
any producers and distributors left to participate. There is 
also some question as to whether the order would cover all 
milk or only milk designated for drinking. Decontrolled 
non-fluid prices could bring lower incomes to dairy farmers
Should total deregulation become the state of affairs, 
producers would likely scramble for an FMMO despite their 
concerns— even some dubious control is better than none at 
all. The fight for existing state controls has been and will 
continue to be intense as producers seek to maintain what 
they think is a better deal.
An Incomes Policy: Target-Pricing
Some experts in the field of agricultural policy 
have long suggested that the real problem of any agricultural 
sector is inadequate income. Low prices generate low
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incomes which prevent the farmer from purchasing capital 
equipment, consumer goods, and the like. Since price- 
fixing that is not in line with market conditions tends to 
create distortions— shortages with lower-than-market prices, 
surpluses with higher-than-normal prices— it would be better 
to insure a proper income through subsidization. This can 
be accomplished by setting a target price above that which 
the market would establish. Producers would sell at the 
market price but would be compensated at a level equal to 
the target price less the market price multiplied by the 
number of goods the producer has sold. This plan, now used 
as a tool of federal agricultural policy, eliminates price 
distortions while giving consumers the opportunity to make 
purchases at lower prices. The producer is assured a target 
price that would provide him with a reasonable return on
Qinvestments.^
Such a scheme could be a theoretical substitute for 
Montana's existing control law. Producers and perhaps 
distributors could be compensated at target price levels 
while selling goods at lower market prices. The target 
prices could be established by the existing flexible 
formulas. The state would subsidize the industry to the 
extent that target prices exceeded market prices- Of course, 
the event that market prices exceeded the target price, 
there would be no subsidy. Payments could be made on a
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regular basis after submission of actual cost and price data 
is submitted to the regulatory industry. Economists endorse 
an incomes policy of this type since it would bring the 
social cost of food production down to the level of consumer 
preferences, even if it costs the government ; i.e., the 
taxpayer, in tax dollars
Serious workability questions can be raised about 
such a plan. To the author's knowledge, no policy of this 
kind is carried on at a state level. The economic resources 
required to make this plan feasible may be too enormous for 
a state to handle. There is also a question as to the 
perceived advantage of subsidies. When the target pricing 
plan was first advocated by the U.S. Department of Agricul­
ture in the 19^0s and early 1950s, many producers and poli­
ticians denounced it as "socialistic" and destructive of 
individual incentive. There is no reason to believe that 
some segments of the Montana dairy industry and general 
public would react any differently as the 1970s comes to a 
close. Income subsidies are also quite visible and there­
fore, subject to public scrutiny and political logrolling. 
"Price" subsidies like the existing law hidden behind 
administrative doors. For reasons of economic and political 
impracticality developing an incomes policy may be a moot 
point. It would be interesting to further study its 
feasibility, though.
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Cooperatives and Collective Bargaining
Another substitute for existing producer price 
regulation would be the formation of cooperatives among 
producers. The cooperative would collectively bargain for 
prices with a local distributor, or enter the processing- 
distribution business on its own. Formation of cooperatives 
among agricultural producers is permissable under state law 
and the federal Capper-Volstead Act of 1922. Minor adjust­
ments in the state law could be made if necessary to accom-
12modate special milk marketing co-ops.
Cooperative power restores a proper balance in the 
relationship of producers vis-a-vis their distributor. Some 
northwestern and south-central Montana producers consolidated 
in this fashion years ago to compete more effectively.
Minimum price regulations should be enforced by law if 
necessary to provide floors beneath which strong distribu­
tors could not force a weaker producer association. A co­
operative would also be able to take advantage of pooled 
human, capital, and financial resources.
Cooperatives are not without their problems. Abuse 
of internal authority is a common problem in cooperative 
management. Indeed, one observer of the Montana milk indus­
try has suggested that the few dairy co-ops now operating in 
the state are not co-ops in the sense that their founders 
envisioned. They have taken on a monopolistic and
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undemocratic nature not unlike the processor firms they were
1 Zidesigned to counter in the 1920s and 1930s. The market 
power of large mid-western U.S. cooperatives in their 
dealings with distributors, retailers and even their own 
members speaks of the constant need for vigilence by the 
true owners of any cooperative organization.^^
The economic feasibility of producer-owned supply 
plants is also questionable. A study of such a plan was 
done several years ago at Montana State University and con­
cluded that the projected returns did not justify the
1 6)required investment by producers. Should the same results 
prove true today, only government subsidy could effect a 
profitable investment. The problem of subsidy was examined 
earlier.
The notion of cooperative marketing or collective 
bargaining by strong producers also raises the spector of 
abuse of that power insofar as the public is concerned. 
Memories of an interstate agricultural "holding action" by 
the National Farmers' Organization in 196? are all too clear 
in the minds of many. The spectacle of seeing thousands of 
gallons of milk dumped in order to cut supplies and raise 
prices seems immoral in the minds of most citizens, even in 
it does make economic sense. Abnormal marketing actions and 
undue price enhancement are forbidden under Capper-Volstead 
and federal antitrust law, but even these restrictions have
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not stopped farmers from engaging in questionable activity. 
Even price control looks better to some in comparison with 
this activity
Despite their inherent problems, cooperative market­
ing and processing could be a viable institution even with 
some minimum price fixtures left intact. As agriculture 
faces continuing demands on its land, labor and other 
resources, they may be the only feasibly farm organization 
for a state like sparsely-populated Montana.
Public Enterprise
During a period of milk market instability in 
Wisconsin in the 1930s, the state's legislature considered 
putting state or local government into the milk distribution 
business. This program of "municipalization" of private 
processor-distributors was designed to cut supposedly out­
landish price-gouging by the industry in its dealing with
producers and consumers. The bill had broad support, but
1 ftnot enough to insure its final passage.
If Montana's oligopolistic distribution system would 
be unstable and exploitive under deregulation, then perhaps 
the proper safeguards would be the infusion of so-called 
"public enterprise" by the government. The enterprise could 
be of three kinds : (1) Direct state ownership and operation 
of one or more processing plants purchased from private 
owners or newly built with public funds. Montana has
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already established a precedent of public ownership in the 
liquor business. The state-owned facilities would serve as 
a "yardstick" in measuring the practices of privately-owned 
distributors. The public firms could be required to operate 
at a profit and submit payments in lieu of taxes paid by a 
regular private firm. This would insure some parity in the 
competition between public and private firms; (2) Partial 
public ownership and/or supervision of privately-owned dis­
tributors . The state would purchase an interest in an 
existing company's activities, or appoint "public directors" 
as part of the management of the firm. The director would 
have access to records and activities of the distributor. 
This would insure the state an opportunity to measure the 
equity and economy of the firm’s business practices; (3) 
Regulation of milk distributors as a "public utility" like 
Montana Power or Mountain Bell. The state would insure
specific and reasonable profits to each firm at rates that
19are fair and just to retailers, producers and consumers.
There is little liklihood of the third alternative
becoming a reality. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Hegemen
Farms Corporation v. Baldwin that while affected with a
public interest, the milk industry cannot be considered a
20public utility in the legal sense. The first and second 
options would surely be seen as alien and too ambitious by 
the industry, government, and the public. The cry of
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socialism may prove too effective even in a day when more 
citizens urge the nationalization of the oil industry. 
Wholly-owned public firms may prove inefficient and seek 
legislative subsidization as a bail-out for ineptitude. 
Partial ownership may be impractical and ill-suited to the 
internal ownership-management structure of Montana 
distributors.
Wolf's theory of non-market failures easily applies 
in the case of public enterprise. There is also a question 
as to whether the problems of an oligopolistic industry 
really require drastic government supervision. The costs of 
regulation may outweigh any potential gains, although the 
provision for public directors or supervisors might provide 
a means of preventing unfair trade practices.
A Consumer Council
When public utilities in Montana seek a rate 
increase, the consumer is assured of representation by 
trained, supervised economists and attorneys; i.e., the 
Montana Consumer Council. The creation of a "milk consumer 
council" that would intervene on behalf of consumers during 
public hearings on price order or board regulations could 
insure a consistent pattern of misrepresentation that the 
board does not now see. A small staff consisting of accoun­
tants, economists and attorneys could be supported by a 
small checkoff fee on the retail price of milk, just as
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public utilities pay a small consumer tax today. The coun­
cil could be supervised by a bipartisan legislative committee 
paralleling the present Legislative Consumer Council.
It can be argued that such a mechanism duplicates 
existing functions of the Montana Milk Control Board. The 
board is presently made up of consumers. They and the staff 
of the Milk Control Division presumably establish prices 
that are fair to all parties. However, this same argument 
could be made about the Public Service Commission. Elected 
commissioners theoretically represent the legitimate 
interests of the public as well as the utilities. The Con­
sumer Council insures that public representation is real and 
not assumed. The prospects for a legislative milk consumer 
council should be pursued as a means of solving the public 
goods problem if the existing regulatory machinery is to 
remain intact.
Summary
Although there are alternatives to the present system, 
the practicality of each one can be called into question.
Some form of deregulation, possibly combined with bits and 
pieces of other proposals, seems to be the only practical 
alternative from an economic standpoint. Milk price regula­
tion operates within a political framework, however. The 
evidence presented in Chapter VII suggests that radical 
reform of the existing law has been an impossibility. Such
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reforms are advancing more rapidly nowadays and may receive 
support in constituencies other than the legislature. 
Developing a base for political change will be the subject 
of Chapter IX.
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CHAPTER IX
SOURCES OF REFORM: AN EVALUATION
Building a Constituency for Change
Various legislators and the Milk Control Board 
have tried and failed to direct new ideas into constructive 
action. Assuming the continued saliency of milk prices as 
a political issue, it is wise to consider whether these 
groups can translate a knowledge of reform into political 
change. This consideration will be examined in the follow­
ing pages, keeping in mind the proposition that the dairy 
industry is not likely to compromise the law much further.
The Legislature
While decontrol legislation has failed to pass every 
time since 1937» the legislature is still a likely forum 
for change. Optimists point to one existing mechanism as a 
means of controlling potential abuses and indiscretions of 
public regulatory agencies* This mechanism, the so-called 
"sunset law," is designed to abolish or restructure agencies 
that are no longer serving the purposes for which they are 
intended. Legislative policy declares that business and 
professional regulation must serve the public health and
125
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welfare and not have an adverse effect on the competitive 
market. Theoretically, all agencies involved in such 
regulation are automatically terminated unless a performance 
audit indicates that the agency serves a useful purpose. If 
it is reestablished, its life is extended for six years, 
whereupon a new performance audit will be conducted. Sunset 
is an action-forcing mechanism which forces legislators to 
review their creations periodically. The burden of proof of 
service is shifted from the legislature to the agency.̂
All agencies are reviewed on a cyclical basis. 
Fourteen agencies were reviewed between 1977 and 1979*
Another twenty-one agencies will be reviewed between 1979 
and 1981. The final cycle will extend from I98I to 1983.
The Milk Control Board will be included in the final cycle. 
The legislative auditor’s office is responsible for develop­
ing performance audits of each agency during the examina- 
2tion period.
Like performance budgeting, management by objectives, 
and zero-based budgeting, there is something of political 
naivete in the establishment of sunset legislation. Not all 
individuals concur on one definition of the "public health 
and welfare" or "efficiency?" These terms take on a polit­
ical meaning as various interest groups jockey to save those 
boards and agencies that "truly" serve the public, and 
eliminate the "unnecessary" or "detrimental" ones. A sunset
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law can provide information on agency activities and perhaps 
force the consideration of that information, hut it cannot 
require the information to be believed or accepted by all 
individuals•
Of the thirteen agencies up for review by the 1979 
legislature, only three were abolished; none of these were 
of much significance in the regulatory framework of the 
state. The rest were reenacted with only modest revisions* 
Legislative action did not follow recommendations in many 
cases. A notable exception was the restructuring of real 
estate regulation. Still, the future may prove the better 
of sunset; after all, it has nowhere to go but up.^
The legislative auditor has already questioned the 
need for resale price protection of milk. It remains to be 
seen whether the legislature will ultimately carry out those 
recommendations. That will depend on whether several legis­
lators are either convinced of the need for change or 
replaced by people who are already convinced. This puts a 
great burden on the public— especially urban voters— to 
relay any dissatisfaction they might have with milk control.
The Governor
Montana governors have not been known to provide 
much effective leadership in legislative matters; there are 
a few exceptions to this rule (e.g., Joseph Dixon and 
Forrest Anderson.) The present governor, Thomas Judge,
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5sides with the advocates of control. One Republican candi­
date for governor in 1980 has supported deregulation mea­
sures as a legislator, but he may not press the issue in his 
campaign.^ Taxing, government spending, and evironment/ 
energy problems will be given more importance in the hierar­
chy of campaign politics* It is also unlikely that a gover­
nor or governor candidate will alienate rural constituents 
on the issue of milk control. All the major farm organiza­
tions have opposed deregulation in previous sessions.̂
Other Executive Branch Agencies
The Milk Control Board has been skewered on several 
occasions when trying to devise new price orders- Should the 
board's recent proposal survive an August 1979 hearing and 
possible court challenge, it will be the first significant 
change in many years. The outcome is not easily predictable.
Another executive agency has indicated an interest in 
criticizing the present regulatory structure. The Antitrust 
Enforcement Bureau (ABB) of the Montana Department of 
Justice is presently investigating state agency practices 
which may adversely affect competition. The milk board has 
been selected as one of their prime areas of investigation. 
The Federal Trade Commission has let it be known that it will 
strike down regulations that have outlived their purpose and 
which perpetuate inequities and inefficiencies. The FTC has 
already acted on legal and dental advertising, and eyeglass
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manufacturing and sales- Milk control is another potential
area of study. The AEB program gives Montana a chance to
"put its own house in order before the federal government
18sends in a housekeeper-"
AEB files are confidential, so this author is unaware 
of their contents. All that is known is that the investiga-
Qtion has proceeded as planned.̂
The Courts
The Montana judiciary is not a proper forum for 
revamping economic regulation. The Supreme Court has made 
it clear that the milk control law is constitutional; it 
will not question the economic wisdom of the lawmakers. A 
recent Nebraska Supreme Court decision striking down that 
state's milk control law is inapplicable to Montana. The 
Gillette Dairy Inc., v. Nebraska Dairy Product Board ruling 
uses a substantive due process test to question economic 
judgments. This test is almost never applied in economic 
cases— at least that has been the rule since the Nebbia 
decision in 193^*^^
District courts and attorneys in Montana will likely 
follow the lead of the Supreme Court in assessing the valid­
ity of milk price regulation. Attorneys who defended 
Rehberg in 19^2 were conservative Republicans opposed to 
government regulation. The Chief Attorney, Rex Hibbs, voted 
against the 1959 amendments when serving as a state senator
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11from Yellowstone County. Courts will only provide a check 
on questionable administrative decisions of the Milk Control 
Board.
Political Parties
Montana's political parties will not force the issue 
of milk price deregulation. The issue would be hotly con­
tested and would leave bad feelings more than party unity. 
Also, parties are notoriously incapable of enforcing many 
platform decisions on their legislators. In the absence of 
sanctions; i.e., control over candidate selection, pre­
primary endorsements, etc., political parties are not a sound 
constituency for change.
The Dairy Industry
One cannot leave out the possibility that the 
industry itself will support a reform proposal— at the very 
least, a compromise measure which would take some of the 
steam out of a full-blown reform effort. One eastern 
Montana producer remarked to this writer after a legislative 
hearing that "something has got to be done with the law to
12keep everybody happy, but I just don't know what that is."
Another source within the industry has indicated that 
even Jimmy "the Greek" Snyder would not lay good money down 
on the chances of getting the industry to change— much less 
even estimate the odds. This source characterizes the
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dairymen— mainly the distributors— as too stubborn and 
unwilling to change despite the pleadings of their more 
astute lobbyists. Some of them are legitimately concerned 
for their financial welfare; the others are described as 
selfish souls who have only disdain for the public.
Unless a respectable opposition develops in the 
political arena, the dairy lobby will wage a heated battle 
for its views. The comfort of the status quo is not worth 
a sacrifice.
The Public
The problems of consumer organization have been 
thoroughly explained. One group is now attempting to solve 
that problem by sponsoring an initiative to repeal price 
controls. Not much is known about this effort, although its
1 if.existence has been confirmed by several sources. Assuming
surveys are registering a correct reading on public view, a 
small, inexpensive repeal effort could gamer many signatures 
in the urban areas and gain ballot status. The liberaliza­
tion of requirements for obtaining signatures on an initia­
tive has contributed to the eventual success of many recent 
ballot issues. Thus, a popular initiative may be the easiest 
means of reforming the milk control law between now and
1981.̂ ^
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One problem with voter initiatives is that they can 
be hastily and sloppily written without regard for legal, 
economic, and political consequences* Two such measures, a 
recall procedure for public officials and a state budget 
ceiling, found their way to the 1976 ballot. Both proposals 
contained ambiguous and inconsistent wording. Voters 
defeated the budget proposal but passed the recall plan.
The 1977 legislature had to amend the procedures to remove 
ambiguities.^^ An improperly worded initiative on milk con­
trol would have to be drastically revised by the legislature. 
Even a well-written proposal could face retaliation by 
dairymen in the 1981 legislature. Consumer vigilance would 
have to extend beyond the November election to make any 
successful initiative a lasting proposition.
Summary
Pew of Montana's political institutions offer them­
selves as viable constituencies for radical restructuring of 
the milk control law. The people have often responded 
directly when their elected officials fail to act according 
to their wishes* The events of the coming year will prove 
whether milk price controls will be subject to this direct 
action.
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CHAPTER X
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A Historical Overview
The history of milk price regulation in Montana has 
a dual face. Sincerity of purpose in designing the law has 
often been matched by abuse and domination in its implemen­
tation. The chaotic conditions which prompted enactment of 
the law in the 1930s have been replaced by new market real­
ities. Although processor-distributor control of the board 
and the direction of the law has been muted in past years, a 
consumer-oriented board has been frustrated in its attempt 
to further rectify the economic and political imbalance.
The public's dissatisfaction with milk prices has not been 
channeled into constructive change due to the public goods 
problem and the definite political advantage held by the 
organized dairy lobby.
In short, the operation of the Milk Control Board 
falls neatly within the confines of Wolf's theory of non- 
market failure. Regulation seems to have a logic all its 
own Î its path is embellished with increasingly detailed con­
trols and the inequities and externalities that arise as a
134
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consequence of those controls» One political scientist has 
recently suggested that the breakdown of bureaucratic con­
trol in states like Montana may lead to federal preemption 
of many traditional state responsibilities.^ The Federal 
Trade Commission may in fact be the agent which ultimately 
corrects deficiencies in the milk control law. Ironically, 
Montana dairymen have insisted that the state rather than 
the federal government is in a better position to keep the 
economic peace of their industry!
A Modest Proposal
In order that Montana might put its own house in 
order, the author has some suggested proposals which could 
correct economic inefficiency and diffuse industry political 
clout:
1. Wholesale and retail price controls, including the 
setting of jobber prices, should be phased out gradually. The legislature or the people by 
initiative should specify a deadline for termina­
tion of controls. The milk board would develop the administrative details for the phase-out.
2. The board should retain authority to re impose resale 
price controls on a temporary basis in the event of 
emergencies. The law should define "emergency" so 
as not to not allow broad administrative discretion or unwarranted influence by the industry. A pre­
sumption in favor of competitive markets should be 
established by the legislature as a guide to the 
board when exercising their power. An emergency 
order would be adopted without need of a public 
hearing and would be in effect for, say, 120 days. 
During the period of the order, a hearing should be 
held to determine whether the order should be extended.
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3* Mechanisms should he established to protect against 
predatory pricing in the dairy industry. Useful 
tools could include requiring dealers to post their 
costs and prices on a periodic basis, and prohibit­
ing sales below cost. Continuous monitoring by 
state antitrust authorities of potential abuses in the industry will be necessary.
There are some problems with prohibiting sales 
below costs. Unless a workable definition of 
dealers' cost can be agreed upon, enforcement of 
this provision would be difficult. Such prohibi­
tions could themselves be interpreted under certain 
conditions as a form of resale price maintenance and therefore, potentially damaging to the public 
interest. The legislature should devise a workable 
standard based on the experiences of other states.
Producer price controls should be continued. While 
this might seem discriminatory to distributors, it 
can be justified on the basis of the unique relation­
ship between producer and distributor. Guiding principles behind this proposal are protection of 
small agricultural units as a social good, and 
realization of the political clout of the dairy 
lobby.
Legal price protection always involves the 
possibility of economic inefficiencies. In the long run, it would be more economically advantageous for 
producers to develop cooperative processing and/or 
marketing programs as an alternative to producer 
price controls. These efforts could provide suit­
able prices and the ability to exploit economies of 
scale. Economic efficiencies derived from coopera­
tive ventures could then be transferred to consumers*
5- All milk retailers should be licensed. The licensewould be purchased for a nominal fee and would be 
subject to suspension or revocation upon a finding 
that the law or board rules and orders have been 
violated by the retailer. The license should not be 
issued on a quota basis. The purpose of retail 
licensure is to give the board greater authority in 
controlling unfair trade practices.̂
6. The independent testing program of the board should
be strengthened. The 1977 legislature gave the
Department of Business Regulation the authority to 
inspect milk on an independent basis. The 1979 
legislature cut this program back. Despite the
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existence of Proposition 13 fever, the legislature 
should be obligated to fund those laws it has 
enacted. The testing program can be used to catch 
unscrupulous processors and assist honest firms to 
update the quality of their testing program.3
With the major exception of wholesale price deregu­
lation, and the provision for lesser items, this proposal is 
remarkably similar to one endorsed by the Milk Control 
Board in late 1978.^ Processor-distributors should not be 
entitled to full price protection, given the arguments 
advanced earlier. The provisions of items 3 and 5 of the 
above proposal should be sufficient safeguards. Government 
price protection of an oligoply is practically unnecessary 
if not down right absurd.^
One point not yet stressed is that processor-distrib­
utors have been departing the industry at a standard rate 
under price control. This has been due to a number of 
factors; inefficiency of operation; poor management; etc. 
There is no reason to believe that these problems will cease 
when and if price controls are lifted. Legislators, the 
board, and the public should be on guard that the industry 
does not use the phenomena of natural departure as a guise 
for reimplementing a permanent price-fixing scheme.
This package of reforms may appear to be a less-than- 
logical outcome of the critical analysis presented in 
previous chapters. The author has tempered the necessity of 
reform with political realities. It is reasonable to expect
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reformers to implement a proposal without making certain 
concessions to dairy interests. Unless the balance of power 
is overwhelmingly in favor of the reformers, trade-offs and 
compromise of economic and political values will be neces­
sary. This "modest proposal" is designed with political 
realities in mind.
Conclusion
Harold Lasswell once described politics as a process 
of who gets what, when, and how.^ Obviously the design, 
implementation, and continuation of milk price control fits 
into this general category of political intrigue. Alter­
natives to existing regulations will come about only at the 
expense of a fierce lobbying effort by many interests. 
Efforts to dissolve the inequities of regulation have been 
successful in many states. It remains to be seen whether 
Montana will accomplish the same goal without contributing 
to economic chaos. Failure to proceed in a reasonable 
fashion may lead to "Big Brother" in Washington becoming the 
final arbiter.
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NOTES
CHAPTER XI
^"Unicameral legislature could cure state’s 
political ills, says UM prof," Great Falls Tribune.
8 July 1979, P- 15-
pOffice of the Legislative Auditor, Report, p. 85*
3Interview with K. M- Kelly, Helena, Montana,
22 June 1979'
^Minutes of the Montana Milk Control Board,
Volume 6, December 9» 1978•
^"Milk ruling lauded," Great Falls Tribune,
27 April 1976, p. 5-
^Harold Lasswell, Politics : Who Gets What, When. How
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938).
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